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RÉS liMÉ 
Cette étude examine les corrélations illusoires (CI) basées sur la saillance ( distinctiveness) 
des stimuli. Nous utilisons un paradigme similaire à celui de l'étude classique de Hamilton et 
Guifford (1976) afin de reproduire l'effet sauf que nous avons utilisé deux individus au lieu de 
deux groupes. Nous avons présenté 36 phrases ou photos décrivant un acteur ayant des 
comportements 'favorable' ou 'défavorable' à 292 étudiants d'un CÉGEP. Immédiatement 
après la présentation ainsi qu'une semaine plus tard, les étudiants ont rempli un questionnaire 
mesurant l'attribution de chaque comportement à l'un ou l'autre des acteurs, l'estimation de la 
fréquence des comportements minoritaire, le rappel libre et la reconnaissance d'un sous-groupe 
de stimuli et de leurres. Les résultats ont été examinés selon le médiwn de présentation (verbal 
ou .visuel), le type de saillance (comportements minoritaires soit défavorables ou favorables) et 
. la tâche d'orientation (formation d'impression ou de mémorisation). Les résultats démontrent 
que l'effet de CI se produit pour des individus (au lieu de groupes) et ceci dans les deux modes 
de présentation (verbal et visuel). Contrairement à nos attentes, 1 'effet de CI est plus prononcé 
lorsque les comportements favorables sont minoritaires. De plus, il semble que les processus de 
formation d'impression et de mémorisation se produisent indépendamment de l'orientation 
donnée par les consignes. Les résultats ne confirment pas le rôle de la saillance sur l'effet de 
con·élation illusoire. Il serait donc nécessaire d'envisager une/des explication(s) alternative(s) 
pour ce phénomène. Le facteur temps, innovateur dans ce domaine, démontre que l'effet peut 
apparaître et même devenir pl us fort après sept jours. Cette recherche tend à démontrer que 
l'effet de CI peut se généraliser aux cibles individuelles et que le phénomène repose sûr les 
erreurs de la mémoire, notamment les fausses alarmes et les erreurs d'attributions, au lieu que 
sur la saillance des stimuli minoritaires. Finalement, nous discutons des contributions ainsi que 
des limites de notre étude. Nous offrons également quelques pistes pour les recherches futures. 
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ABSTRACT 
Trus study specifically focused on distinctiveness-based illusory correlations (!Cs). By using 
a paradigm that varied only slightly from Hamilton and Gifford's (1976), we reproduced the 
illusory correlation (IC) effect with stimuli depicting two individuals instead of two groups. We 
presented 36 sentences or photos describing an actor who displays socially desirable or 
undesirable behaviour to 292 college students. Immediately, after the presentation and one 
week later they filled out a questionnaire wruch measured their correct attribution of behaviours 
to one or the other ac tor, their estimation of the frequency of rninority behaviour, free recall and 
recognition of a sub-group of hits and foils. Results were examined by comparing re effects in 
the two media of presentation (verbal vs. visual), the two types of salience (undesirable 
minority behaviour vs. desirable minority behaviour) and task set (impression formation vs. 
memorization). We found an IC effect for stimuli depicting individuals in both media. Contrary 
to our expectations, the IC effect was stronger when minority behaviour was favourable. It 
seems that the processes of impression formation and memorization occur regardless of the task 
condition. Overall, results do not confirm the role of salience, and it is necessary to consider 
other approaches to explaining trus phenomenon. The time factor, which is an innovation in 
thi s area of research, revealed that the re effect could either first appear or increase after seven 
days. Our data suggests that illusory correlations can be generalized to stimuli depicting 
in di viduals, not just groups of people or groups of inanimate abjects. Our data also suggests that 
the phenomenon stem from errors of memory, particularly false alarms and misattribution, 
rather than from an enhanced memory for salient items. Finally, we indicate the implications 
and limitations of this study as weil as suggestions for future research. 
Key words: experiment, study, distinctiveness-based illusory correlations, effect of ti me, 
verbal medium, visual medium, real worid salience, experimental salience, impress ion task, 
memory task, attribution, frequency, recall, recognition. 
CHAPTERI 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The field of illusory correlation (IC) research has been much neglected for a 
number of years. In fact, little if anything about the subject has been published in 
the last ten years. However, the reduced interest in the phenomenon is not the 
result ofhaving resolved ali issues concerning the cause ofthe phenomenon or the 
result of a lack of generality Ln the previous findings. Despite its neglect, empirical 
research has shown that the IC effect is a robust phenomenon (Mullen & Johnson, 
1990; meta-analysis by McGarty, C., Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., et al, 1993). 
The term " illusory correlation" was frrst coined by Chapman in 1967 who 
defmed it as an erroneous association between two variables. More specifically, an 
IC is a cognitive error or bias that occurs when one perceives an association either 
that is not there or that is considerably weaker than one believes it to be. The 
· literature describes two types of illusory correlations (ICs); those based upon 
expectations derived from pre-existing knowledge about a stimulus ( e.g. 
stereotypes) orthose derived from the distinctiveness or salience of the stimulus 
itself ( e.g. a loud pers on in a li brary full of quiet people). The present thesis will 
focus on distinctiveness based illusory correlations. 
The most common paradigm for studying the phenomenon was developed by 
Hamilton and Gifford ( 1976). [t requires participants to judge two groups of 
persons based on presented information about the socially desll'able and 
undesirable behaviour among selected members of each group. One group is 
represented by twice as many stimuli as the other group, and one type of behaviour 
is represented twice as much as the other type (as depicted in table 1.1 below). 
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Table 1.1 
Distribution of sentences per cell in the Hamilton & Giffard ( 197 6) experiment 
Group A 
Group B 
Pos. sentences 
CellA 
18 stimuli 
Cell C 
9 stimuli 
Neg. Sentences 
Cell B 
8 stimuli 
Cell D 
4 stimuli 
Until the present, the vast majority ofresearch on ICs has aimed at explaining 
biased judgments or stereotypes concerning groups of people. Very little research 
bas been done with this paradigrn to study individuals . The few studies that have 
tested ICs with individuals have shown inconsistent results, which among other 
things, may be attributable to serious divergence from the original paradigm. This 
study is concerned with the IC effect that occurs with stimuli that depict or 
describe individuals instead of groups. To study the phenomenon, we employed a 
paradigm that has been used more recently by various researchers and, which is 
nearly identical to the one originally employed by Hamilton and Giffard (1976). 
A pertinent issue that concerns the perception and judgrnent of individuals 
pertains to misattribution effects. That is, to what extent participants rnistakenly 
assign responsibility for behaviours or actions to a given individual. We wanted to 
d istinguish to what extent such mistakes are, in fact, the result of the bias inherent 
to !Cs, i.e. that such errors are due to an erroneous association between a category 
of behaviour and a specifie individual. In addition, we must note that prior research 
has presented conflicting results on the implication of memory in this phenomenon. 
We feel it important to determine in what way the bias and errors inherent to the IC 
phenomenon are associated with memory effects. More specifically we would like 
12 
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to see to what extent such effects are due to distinctiveness and salience or due to 
errors in recall and false alarms in recognition. 
The developers of the classic paradigm for studying this phenomenon had also 
devised a second experiment (Hamilton and Giffard, 1976, experiment 2) where 
· the valence of the stimuli was reversed (positive behaviour was in the minority for 
both groups of persans). They still found an re effect. To our knowledge, this 
variant was never replicated. Therefore, at least a second study reversing the 
valence is much needed to see if the fmdings can be replicated. 
So far, all research that has been done on res has focused on its immediate 
effects. We would like to establish if the re bias has more long-term effects and 
determine if it contributes to the formation and to the maintenance of false 
memories over time. This could lead to important consequences in the 
rnisperception of other individuals ' behaviour. The inclusion of a delay before re-
testing, i.e. including a time factor, would be a needed addition to the research on 
this phenomenon. As we can see, there are still quite a few issues left to be 
resolved in the field of illusory correlations. 
There are six main objectives to this study. 1) To determine if the re effect is 
possible with stimuli depicting two separate individuals instead of two separate 
groups of people or two separate groups of abjects. 2) To determine the role of 
memory with regard tore effects. 3) To determine iftime affects illusory 
. correlations. A time measure is frequent in memory research but inexistent in 
traditional re research. 4) To determine if the medium of presentation affects the 
re phenomenon. We will use visual stimuli (images of actors perforrning various 
behaviours) as well as the traditional verbal stimuli (sentences describing actors 
performing various behaviours) to see if the re effect extends to both media when · 
using individual targets. 5) To determine if individual targets instead of group 
targets produce an re effect when using reversed salience, (i.e. with positive 
behaviour as the rare category) as was found by Hamilton and Giffard (1976, exp. 
2). 6) Finally, we wish to determine iftask set hasan influence on the re effect. As 
such, we will be measuring if differences exist between an impression formation 
13 
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task and a memory task. These objectives will contribute to our better 
understanding of the phenomenon and allow us to increase our knowledge as to its 
-seemingly ubiquitous nature. Our experiment will revolve around a 2 (media) x 2 
(salience) x 2 (task) repeated (time) measures design. 
THEORETieAL eONTEXT 
The notion of distinctiveness based res refers to the characteristics of certain 
stimuli, which render them distinct or prominent (i.e. salient) in a given context. 
Distinctiveness or salience derives from any aspect of a stimulus that for any 
reason makes it stand out (Reber, 1995). A stimulus can become distinctive by any 
number of ways. It could be novel, infrequent, figuratively attractive, unusual, 
- goahelevant, or it could simply dominate the visual (or auditory) fie ld. A person 
could be asked to pay attention to a certain stimulus and that alone makes it 
distinctive. In this way, distinctiveness elicits attention, increases the percei ved 
prominence of a stimulus in various judgments, and influences most evaluations of 
causality (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Regardless of the way it is created, it has been 
shown to have robust and wide-ranging effects (McArthur, 1981). We will add 
refinement to this cognitive phenomenon as we proceed. First, let us indulge in the 
research that branded the term. 
The first study that identified res was conducted by ehapman (1967) and 
although subsequent authors did research on either expectancy or distinctiveness-
based Ies, ehapman identified both. In this study, he presented participants with 
equal-ly occurring word pairs such as: lion-tiger, bacon-eggs and blossoms-
notebook. When asked to give details on what had been presented, participants 
r~ported that sorne word pairs had appeared more often than others . The word pairs 
reported to have appeared more often were either longer in length like blossoms-
notebook, which he categorized as distinctive, or associated in usage like bacon-
eggs or lion-tiger, which he categorized as expectancy-based. From this 
14 
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experiment, he suggested that infrequently occurring stimuli or distinctive stimuli 
were particularly noticeable or striking to participants. 
Chapman's work inspired Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) seminal research on 
ICs. This research sought to determine whether participants would associate less 
frequent ly presented behaviour descriptions with a less frequent ly presented group. 
They hypothesized that stereotypie judgments could develop from purely cognitive 
information-processing mechanisms. The paradigm they devised consisted of 
sequentially presenting participants with 39 sentences varying from moderately 
positive, e.g. "John, a member of group A, visited a sick friend in the hospital," to 
mildly negative, e.g. Steven, a member of group B, made a sarcastic remark 
towards another persan. The 39 sentences were divided into four groups or cells 
representing a two by two (2X2) cross-classification. Both groups and behaviours 
were presented in a 2: 1 ratio. As a result, group "A" members were described by 
18 positive and 8 negative sentences, while, group "B" members were described 
by 9 positive and 4 negative sentences as previously presented in table 1.1. For this 
. experiment, participants were told that behaviours and group sizes were drawn 
from population samples and that in effect group B was smaller than group A. 
· Each of the 39 statements was presented one at a time for a period of eight 
seconds. Once all 39 sentences were presented, participants had to complete three 
different tasks or dependent measures, as described below. 
Trait ratings comprised the first dependent measure that Hamilton and Giffard 
(1976) asked participants to complete. In this task, participants were asked to rate 
members of two separate groups on a series of 20 attributes. The selected attributes 
were categorized as either social/interpersonal ( e.g. popular, sociable vs. irritable, 
unhappy) or intellectual/task-related (e .g. industrious, intelligent vs. !azy, foo lish) . 
The authors hypothesized that if "paired distinctiveness" was the basis for 
stereotypie judgments, then participants would rate group B as less desirable since 
the occurrence of negative sentences (i .e. cell D) for this group occurred only four 
times thus making them distinctive. Trait rating results indicated that participants 
rated group B with more undesirable attributes than they did for group A. 
15 . 
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The second dependent measure was an attribution to group membership. In this 
task, participants were required to read 39 sentences in the form "John, member of 
group ____, visited a sick friend in the hospital." Participants had to indicate group 
membership (either A orB) in the space provided. For this measure, the authors 
hypothesized that if the co-occurrence of distinctive events results in an 
overestimation oftheir frequency, there would be a tendency to overestimate 
negative. behaviours for group B. This is exactly what they found. Specifically, 
although only one-third of the undesirable statements described members of group 
B (4/12), over half of them were attributed to that group. The authors therefore 
stipulated that participants falsely attributed undesirable behaviours to the smaller 
group. 
The third measure consisted of asking participants the frequency at which the 
statements appeared. For this, participants were given the total number of 
statements describing each group and subsequently asked to estimate how many 
undesirable statements were presented for each ofthese two groups. The authors 
hypothesized that if participants overestimated the frequency of co-occurrence of 
the distinctive events, they would overestimate the number of undesirable 
behaviours in the B group, which is exactly what they observed. Hence, with the 
presentation of groups and behaviours in a 2: 1 ratio, the au thors found a 
distinctiveness-based re effect for trait ratings, attribution to group and frequency 
estimation measures. 
In a second experiment (Hamilton and Giffard, 1976, experiment 2), the 
authors reversed the valence of the two categories of behaviour. Whereas the 
minority behaviour bad been negative in the first experirnent, it was now positive, 
and vice versa for the majority behaviour. Consequently, the !east frequent 
behaviour for both groups was now comprised respective! y of nine positive 
statements for cell B and four for cell D. The authors obtained the same type of 
results as in the previous experiment, which led them to conclude that 
distinctiveness was a stable phenomenon regardless of the type of behaviour being 
used (either negative or positive). With these fmdings, Hamilton and Giffard 
16 
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(1976, exp. 2) concluded that the IC effect could be based solely on the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in processing information about events that differ in their 
frequencies of co-occurrence. To our knowledge, the valence reversai of behaviour 
has never been replicated for this type of experiment. We will therefore attempt to 
replicate their findings. Note that we consider negative behaviour in cell D as more 
representative ofwhat would occur in a real-world situation. Negative behaviour is 
made more salient by its rarity. We will therefore refer to this as the real-world 
salience (RwS) condition. Conversely, when there is positive behaviour in cell D 
(as in Hamilton and Giffard, 1976, experiment 2) we will refer toit as the 
experimental salience (ExS) condition. 
Adding to the reliability of the observed re phenomenon, Hamilton, Dugan and 
Trollier (1985) replicated Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) procedure. The difference 
in this experiment was that participants were shawn a 2x2 surnmary table (sirnilar 
to table 1.1) before being asked to complete the dependent measures. The surnmary 
table specified the freq uencies of positive and negative statements about the two 
groups, but even with this added information, participants still rated the smaller 
group as more negative than the larger group, there again showing a 
:distinctiveness-based IC effect. From this fmding, the authors concluded that once 
the re effect is formed, it might be very difficult to modify cognitively and 
therefore suggested that the re phenomenon creates a cognitive bias in the 
perception of groups. 
The experiments described above confirm that !Cs can be obtained by us ing a 
2: l ratio for groups. The studies show that participants will make biased judgments 
about traits , biased attributions to group membership as well as biased frequency 
estimates about the sm aller group (minority group) and that these biases are due to 
the relatively small number of behaviour descriptions in cell D (minority category 
and minority group) . One study conducted by Risen, Gilovich and Dunning 
(2007), shows that an re effect can be produced by showing a single instance of 
unusual behaviour. They conducted a series of four studies in which participants 
were presented with 16 sentences that described individual members of either a 
17 
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rare or common group performing a rare or common behaviour. Study one showed 
that a single inconsistent behaviour on the part of a minority group member tended 
to elicit greater cognitive processing. Study 2 demonstrated that participants were 
devoted to trying to understand if there was a connection between the group and 
the inconsistent behaviour performed by one of its members. Study 3 showed that 
_participants under this attributional activity tended to forma unit between group 
and anomalous behaviour and that the combination of actor and action makes the 
action particularly memorable. Study 4 demonstrated that people do indeed 
develop !Cs between anomalous behaviours and minority groups when they are 
confronted by such jointly distinctive information in a real-life "one-shot" context. 
Specifically, they found evidence that group-behaviour association would 
general ize to other members of the minority group and influence subsequent 
interactions with members of that group. 
With these results, the authors reiterate the validity ofiCs as presented by 
Hamilton and Gifford (1976), since the same process in the perception of rare 
group/behaviour seems to be occurring. However, their study differs from 
Hamilton and Gifford since they were able to show that a single action can be 
coded as unusual, thereby prompting participants to make sense of what they saw, 
th us exerting a disproportionate weight on the j udgment of unusual behaviour. 
Following this line of reasoning, an unusual behaviour performed by a minority 
group member not only exerts disproportionate judgment weight, thus better 
memory, but also an increased attributional process in which group membership 
can be considered as a plausible explanation for the behaviour. Hence, it would 
seem that an odd behaviour performed by a minority group member would affect 
judgment for the whole group, whereas an odd behaviour from a majority group 
member would affect judgment on! y for that group member. What Risen, Gilovich · 
and Dunning (2007) demonstrated is that one distinctive behaviour description is 
sufficient to alter participant's judgment for the minority group. 
A study conducted by Pouliot and Cowen in 2000, attempted to eliminate 
possible stereotypes associated with the stimuli. White using the classic re 
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paradigm, this study was novel in its approach in that the authors presented groups 
of edibles and non-edibles instead of groups of individuals. These two groups of 
. stimuli had been previously judged not to have any distinct, consistent or universal 
favorability connotations thereby eliminating any possibility of stereotypical 
judgment or expectancies toward the two groups of stimuli. On a TV monitor, 
participants were presented with a series of 39 items divided into a majority group 
(group Z) comprised of 18 non-edible items (e.g. hammer, toothbrush, pencil, etc.) 
and eight edib le items (e.g. apple, cucumber, pizza slice), and a minority group 
(Group Y) which consisted of 8 non-edible and 4 edible items. Thus, the edible 
items for group Y represented cel! D, the most salient cell (corn bining the two 
minority categories; Group Y and edibles) . Their goal was to measure the IC effect 
using the two traditional tasks and to add a third test to measure recognition 
memory. In the recognition task, participants were sequentially presented 32 
stimuli; 16 of which were taken fi:om the original presentation and 16 of which 
were foils (i.e. similar stimuli but never presented). As each stimulus was 
presented participants had to indicate in the ir booklets if the item had (or not) been 
presented. As in the classic research using this paradigrn, the second measure was 
an attribution to group task, requiring participants to attribute each of the original 
39 stimuli to either group Y or Z and in the third task participants were told the 
total number of stimuli for each group and were asked to estimate the frequency of 
the less frequent type of stimulus (i.e. edibles) in both groups. 
The authors also wanted to determine if different levels of cognitive Joad 
affected the phenomenon since various studies had previously demonstrated that 
greater cognitive Joad increases reliance on stereotypes via the availability heuristic 
( defined in the next section). Cognitive load was manipulated by presenting 
stimuli for a duration ofeither four or eight seconds. There was no difference in IC 
effects for the two conditions. In addition, Pouliot and Cowen (2000) were 
innovative in also attempting to determine if the vividness of the items presented 
. would have an effect on the IC phenomenon. In the low vividness condition stimuli 
were presented as sentences such as "The apple belongs to Group Y" , whereas the 
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high vividness stimuli were presented as projected slides showing, for example, a 
photo of an apple with the letter indicating group membership (Y or Z) in the 
lower~right corner of the picture. Using photographs to depict the stimuli had 
never been done before in re research. 
Results for the attribution task showed no significant effects for cognitive [oad 
or vividness. Otherwise, participants attributed more edible items to the smaller 
group'(Y) thus allowing them to conclude that there was an re effect. Results for 
thefrequency estimation task showed no effect due to cognitive load or vividness. 
However, once again, participants reported a significantly higher frequency 
estimate for the minority group (Y), demonstrating an re effect with this measure. 
· Results for the recognition task indicated that cognitive load had no effect. 
Vividness, on the other hand, showed a significant effect. Participants in the high 
vividness condition, i.e. those who saw photographs, had a significantly higher 
level of recognizing hits and also showed fewer false alarms than participants in 
the low vividness category, i.e. those who read sentences. The authors argued that 
ifiCs come from a biased judgment, then memory should reflect that bias by first, 
showing a better hit rate for the minority group, thus indicating that salient items 
have an advantage in retrieval and that second, there should be a higher false alarm 
rate for those same stimuli. Their data showed neither and therefore suggested that 
the re phenomenon was not memory based. 
This study successfully demonstrated that res could occLu· with ordinary stimuli 
that do not have any distinctive connotations with regard to social desirability that 
would distinguish the two categories or the two groups with which they were 
ass.ociated. What is more surprising is that recognition for non-salient items was 
proportionally greater than for salient items thereby demoting saliency as a 
required element for so-called distinctiveness-based res. However, this finding 
may be due to the natme of the stimulus material itse lf and/or may be due to using 
only recognition as a memory measme. 
Just as Pouliot and eowen (2000) found cognitive load had no effect, Fied[er, 
Russer and Gramm (1993) also found that this variable was not an issue for res. 
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On the other hand, their fmclings suggest that information processing was superior 
for the more frequent category of positive behaviour descriptions than for negative 
behaviour descriptions. More specifically, participants in the frequency estimation 
task and in the impressions rating tasks were more accurate, internally consistent 
. and reliable for the majority behaviour descriptions in the majority group (cellA) 
than for the minority behaviour descriptions in the minority group (cell D). They 
. suggest that memory is better for positive behaviour descriptions of the larger 
group than for negative behaviour descriptions for the smaller group. This echoes 
Pouliot and Cowen's (2000) findings using their recognition measure. With 
respect to the IC phenomenon, Fiedler, Russer and Grarnm (1993) , propose that 
cel! D contributes little to the degree of illusion. Rather, they state that it is the 
reduced memory for rare events that contribute to the phenomenon. In other words, 
patiicipants notice that A is positive and also have reduced memory for cell D 
stimuli whlle knowing that there are sorne negative behaviours. As a result of this 
combination, they assign negative behaviours to the group they have less 
experience with, i.e. the minority group. 
In an attempt to elucidate further what Fiedler, Russer and Gramm ( 1993) did, 
Fiedler (2000) presents a mathematical mode! for illusory correlations. He states 
that the Gestalt principle of congruency accounts for expectancy based IC whereas 
the Gestalt principle of distinctiveness is relevant to illusions resulting from the 
asymmetry of positive vs. negative attributes and from infrequency. He also states 
that ICs can be explained using a connectionist framework of correlation 
assessment.. This connectionist framework, which he calls the BIAS mode!, is 
based on the Brunswickian premise that most meaningful correlation tasks 
involving person perception refer to distal entities ( e.g. leadership, health, danger, 
femininity)" (Fiedler, 2000, p.37). According to his mode!, the distal variables are 
inferred from the perceived stimulus. He mentions that singular eues alone wo uld 
have a very modest effect on diagnostics and that one requires many eues to 
warrant a val id perception. His mode! presents quantitative judgrnent scales for 
every concrete proximal attribute (e.g. young-looking, politeness, rapid speech, 
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formai dressing, strong voice, upright posture, warm expression, etc.) . The mode! 
predicts correct perceptions by correlating any given distal attribute ( e.g. 
leadership) with the aforementioned quantitative judgment scales. 
Besicles accounting for expectancy based res (not discussed here), the BIAS 
mode! also accounts for distinctiveness based res in three ways. First, through 
asymmetry (i.e. the tendency to assign different weights to infonnation in different 
cells), second, tlirough the aggregation effect (i.e. when the bias in favor of cell D 
is removed, the effect is due to aggregation from different sample sizes without any 
processing bias.), and third, through infrequency (i.e. when the distribution is 
skewed A=20, B=lO, e = lO, D=S). By finding re effects with this mathematical 
madel, Fiedler proposes that memory may not be a necessary factor for the 
phenomenon to occur. Nonetheless, he adds that memory can have a role in the 
phenomenon. He explains that where infrequency is concemed, participants may 
. not necessari ly have increased memory for cel! D items, but rather, that Jess 
information is forgotten since there was less information presented initially (i.e. 
reduced noise). As such, this study proposes a different explanation for cell D 
stimuli than in the above study by Fiedler, Russer and Graham (1993). 
The Bias mode! is an attempt to operationalize the different types of res into a 
common algorithm where interpretation is excluded. Through a computer program, 
it replicates res due to expectancy, distinctiveness and salience with "very few 
assumptions" (Fiedler, 2000, p.Sl), and it attempts to integrate various fields of 
research that deal with the phenomena (see Fiedler, Freytag and Meiser, 2009). It is 
interesting to note that Fiedler's BIAS mode!, which excludes interpretation, fuels 
the idea that res may simply be a cognitive effect that occurs because of the 
irregularity of stimulus presentation and not because of valence of that stimulus . In 
essence, since information is treated through a mathematical algorithm, it takes 
away any notion that j udgments based on social connotations are invol ved in the 
process. Fiedler thus corroborates the earlier study by Hamilton and Giffard (1976, 
experiment 2) where an re effect was found regardless of the valence (either 
positive or negative) of the stimuli presented in the minority behaviour category 
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(i.e. cells B & D) . Likewise, it corroborates fmdings by Pouliot and Cowen (2000) 
that folU1d IC effects for stimuli of edibles and non-edibles that do not have any 
particular connotations with regard to social desirability. 
Illusory correlation phenomenon with individuals 
Up to now, the research presented concemed the IC phenornenon for groups. 
Very little research has been done with ICs and individuals. However, if the 
phenomenon is as robust and strong as research has suggested, we could surmise 
that it would also occur when judging individuals. One of the few studies that 
looked at !Cs while using individual persans as targets was conducted by 
Sanbonmatsu, Sherman and Hamilton (1987). They compared individual and group 
targets using a procedure which differed from the one used by Hamilton & Giffard. 
Participants in both conditions were presented with 50 sentences. In the group 
condition, each sentence described the behaviour of an individual and his gro up 
mem bership ( e.g. "Bill , member of group C, was la te to work"). A different name 
appeared for each sentence. There were five groups (A-E) and lü sentences per 
group. In the individual condition, only fi.ve narnes were used , each name 
appearing in ten sentences. In both conditions, the ratio of the rnajority to the 
minority sentences was seven to three (7:3) where half the participants received 
seven sentences describing a socially desirable behaviour and three sentences 
describing a socially undesirable behaviour. The other half received the inverse 
ratio of desirable to undesirable sentences. In an effort to create distinctiveness, the 
au thors asked participants to focus respective! y on either one of the five groups or 
one of the five individuals. 
Results show that participants formed ICs with the group targets but not with 
the individual targets . The authors concluded that an IC effect was based on the 
perceived association between the distinctive group and the minority behaviour. As 
for the individual targets, the authors noted that distinctive individuals were 
perceived as being more associated with the majority behaviour than were the other 
four non-distinctive individuals. These results also shadow what Pouliot and 
Cowen (2000) found in their recognition rneasure. 
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·The differing results obtained between the gro up targets and the individual 
targets led Sanbonmatsu, Sherman and Hamilton (1987) to propose that different 
cognitive processes were involved when forming impressions of groups or 
individuals. They proposed that impressions of groups were "memory based" 
· whereas impressions of individuals were made "on-line". According to the authors, 
memory based impressions occur when the perceiver fails to form an evaluation 
during the ·initial processing of the information. In this case, the perceiver would 
rely on the available information at the ti me of recall in order to make his 
evaluation. These au thors proposed that the distinctiveness of the stimuli was 
determined by making a group salient (asking participants to focus on one in 
particular) combined with the infrequent behaviour descriptions for that gro up. 
They posited that ICs were due to distinctive stimuli being encoded more strongly 
thereby facilitating later accessibility in memory and as such, facilitating recall. 
By contrast, the inconsistent results repot1ed for the individual condition of the 
experiment, led the authors to propose that participants formed "on-line" 
irllpressions. In essence, they posited that participants formed impressions as each 
stimulus was encoded. As it is, when each behavioural description is received, the 
perceiver attempts to integrate it into a coherent impression. It is this impression 
that later serves as the basis of judgment. Consequently, the later judgment about 
the persan is said to be more representative of aU events encountered instead of just 
the salient ones (see Hastie & Park 1986). In fact, the authors propose that amidst 
al! the information that is received (i.e. the 10 sentences concerning the target 
individual), it is likely that inconsistent or infrequent behaviour descriptions would 
be discounted. In addition, ambiguous information would likely be interpreted in 
the direction of the initial impression. Thus, a biased assimilation, reinterpretation, 
and discounting of infrequent types of behaviour by the salient target would be 
·likely to occur. Likewise, a greater polarization of the salient target towards the 
majority behaviour would be the outcome (Sanbonmatsu, Sherman and Hamilton, 
1987). 
24 
DBIC and social stimuli 
The au thors note that in the individual condition of their experiment, as king 
participants to focus on one target (10 sentences) thus making it salient may have 
considerably reduced the cognitive load required to complete the task (but as 
mentioned earlier, other authors found cognitive load had no effect on ICs). The 
authors report that results for the remaining four targets were at chance leve t, 
which could indicate that participants may not even have focused on them at al!. In 
other words, asking participants to focus on one individual (10 sentences) may 
have had them consider the other four individuals (40 sentences) as noise. 
Furthermore, directed attention to one particular target may affect the way in which 
information is encoded and therefore affect the nature of the associations and 
evaluations that result. These may have also been a contributing facto r in not 
finding an IC effect. Thus, as Sanbonmatsu, Sherman & Hamilton (1987) 
suggested, it may not be the target itself but the nature of the instructions and the 
task that may have stopped the IC effect from occurring. To our kno wledge, this 
study is the only one that attempted to measure the IC effect for individuals and 
because ·of its discrepant frndings, it leaves many questions unanswered concerning 
the generalization of the effect and the processes underlying the effect with 
different stimuli. 
Asking participants to focus on one group or person was not done in the 
Hamilton and Gifford (1976) study. In their paradigm, distinctiveness was derived 
· from the overall proportion of information about the target. In addition, the 
information about groups was received in a random manner, making it difficult to 
consider the other stimuli about the other targets as "noise. " It is therefore 
important to return to Hamilton and Gifford's paradigm in order to study the 
sirnilarities and differences between processing information about gro up targets 
and individual targets. Hamilton and Gifford (1976) did however, create a 
distinction between groups when they informed participants about thei r different 
sizes; this could have prompted them to judge the groups differently. When people 
witness a behaviour outside the lab, they are not told anything about what they are 
supposed to look at or if the behaviour is from a small or large group. For these 
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reasons, we feel it is important to present our stimuli with the least amount of 
additional information, which cowd create potential judgment biases in our 
participants. 
By alerting participants beforehand about the different group sizes, Hamilton 
and Gifford (1976) may have biased their participants' perception and in this case 
may have caused the re effect to occur for reasons other than salience. Telling 
participants about group size may have created a situation where pruiicipants used 
an anchoring heuristic, (i.e. a cognitive process where decisions are based on an 
initial anchor; similar to priming) to interpret what was being presented. eonsider 
. the following example; in a mock trial when a judge instructed jurors to consider 
the harshest verdict frrst, they rendered significantly harsher verdicts than 
participants who were instructed to consider lenient verdicts first (Greenberg, 
Williams & O'Brien, 1986; in Fiske and Taylor 1991). Similarly, telling 
participants that one group is smaller than another, in contrast to telling them one 
. group is larger than the other, or making an individual salient by telling 
participants to focus on him, may also influence the judgment outcome. For the re 
effect to be applicable in various circumstances, including outside of the lab, one 
must refrain from the type of instructions that tend to guide or create a bias toward 
encoding of stimuli. Therefore, research is needed, which eliminates these potential 
biases and permits a clearer evaluation of the extent to which the re effect 
generalizes to individuals. 
Most of the studies described above tried to replicate, in one form or another, 
the original Hamilton and Gifford (1976) study. They demonstrate that 
distinctiveness-based re effects can occur when participants are presented with 
stimuli regarding two groups, where experimental manipulation made one group 
p.coportionally smaller than the other. However, most of these studies have 
employed sentences that described individuals who were either part of the majority 
group or prui of the minority group. In contrast, one study demonstrated that the 
effect could occur with inanimate (non-stereotyped) objects like edibles and non-
edibles, suggesting that res can be produced with a wider range of stimuli. In 
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· addition, this study established that the effect could be produced with stimuli in the 
form of images as well as with stimuli in the form of more conventional descriptive 
sentences. 
Ultimately, the majority of studies above that used groups as stimuli found IC 
effects. Research done with stimuli of individuals instead of groups did not have 
much success in reproducing the effect (e.g. Sanbonmatsu, Sherman &Hamilton, 
1987). The explanation put forth was that different cognitive processes were 
involved when participants encoded information about groups or about individuals. 
That may be a valid argument, but no other study corroborates these findings. 
Hence, more exploration is needed to substantiate that claim. Then again, their 
study derogated substantially from the original Hamilton and Gifford (1976) 
paradigm, which leads to question whether it was really the individuals (vs. 
Groups) or the methodology that produced the contradictory results. 
As we have seen, the literature is sparse on ICs for individuals and prior 
research concerned with this matter (Sanbonmatsu, Sherman and Hamilton, 1987) 
has not been faithful to the original Hamilton and Gifford ( 197 6) parad igm. The 
proposition put forth by Sanbonmatsu and his colleagues that two cognitive 
processes were involved in the treatment of information offers a plausible 
explanation as to why ICs were not found in the individual condition. Let us now 
explore the differences and similarities between on-line and memory-based 
cognitive processing. 
Cognitive processing: on-line vs. memory-based 
As presented by Fiske and Taylor (1991), using prior information to make a 
judgment involves the use of schemas or top-down processing. This kind of 
cognitive process is strongly influenced by prior knowledge (i.e. it is conceptually, 
or theory driven). When using schemas, the perceiver gets the general idea of what 
is presented rather than creating a replica in memory of ali the detailed information 
presented. In this respect, rnemory-based or top-down processing leads to 
judgments of the stimulus that are more holistic and less precise. This can lead to a 
cogrùtive bias that is similar to an expectancy-based IC to the extent that one relies 
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on schemas rather than the precise information when making a judgment. Intrus 
sense, expectancy based IC would be more likely as a result oftrus type of 
processmg. 
According to. Sanbonrnatsu, Sherman and Hamilton (1987), on-line processing 
occur when the perceiver fonns an impression as the stimulus is encoded. This is 
like bottom-up or data-driven processing because information is used to make a 
judgment as it is being perceived (Abelson, l981b; Bobrow & Norman, 1975; 
Rumelhart & Ortonym, 1977, in Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Although it is possible to define and examine both expectancy and 
·distinctiveness !Cs independently, it would be difficult to make them completely 
independent from each other, just as it is impossible to totally separate top-down 
and bottom-up processing because they are not mutually exclusive. AU processing 
involves the association of incoming stimuli with pre-existing schemas in memory 
whilè at the same tune being guided by the concrete characteristics of the data as it 
·is ~:eceived. In the same way, the process underlying distinctiveness based IC 
effects may not be totally devoid of expectations and the process underlying 
expectancy based IC effects may not be devoid ofperceived distinctiveness. A 
given stimulus may be novel or distinctive as it is initially perceived but it becomes 
referenced to prior information or pre-existing schemas as it is encoded. This could 
attenuate the distinctive nature of the stimulus. Therefore, although a distinctive 
stimulus may be perceived as such, the judgment based on that stimulus may use 
other information from memory with which that stimulus was associated and no 
longer be based on the initial distinctive quality. 
Sanbonmatsu, Sherman and Hamilton ( 1987) proposed that memory-based 
cognitive processes were involved when it came to processing group information, 
-- i.e . participants did not fonn an impression of the various groups at the time the 
information was initially perceived but rather at the time the information was 
retrieved in order to make a judgment orto respond in sorne way. However, the 
research reviewed so far using the classic paradigm and groups as targets indicate 
that distinctiveness based IC occurs when an on-line cognitive processing strategy 
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is used. The difference between these accounts and that proposed by Sanobmatsu, 
Sherman & Hamilton (1987) may be due to the changed paradigm, methodology 
and task in the latter study. 
Other research has attempted to determine whether different instructional sets 
given to participants would have an effect on the way information is encoded and 
consequently affect subsequent impression. At the same time, it was important to 
determine whether information about individual targets and group targets were 
processed in the same way. McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton ( 1994) used three 
different instruction sets (impression, memory & comprehension) to determine if 
participants used an on-line or a memory based strategy to encode information 
about individuals or groups. The authors closely followed the Hamilton and 
· Gifford (197 6) paradigm, but instead of presenting a set of 3 9 stimuli, they 
· presented 36. As such, they could truly obtain a 2:1 ratio within and between the 
two groups as well as within and between the two behaviours. As a result, cell A, 
B, C and D contained respectively 16, 8, 8 and 4 stimuli. Prior to the presentation 
of 36 stimulus sentences, participants were instructed to either 1) form a coherent 
impression of what each group (person) would be like or, 2) concentrate hard on 
comrnitting each statement to memory or, 3) try to assess whether or not a fourth-
grade child would have difficulty in the comprehension of each sentence. 
In the "individual" condition, participants read sentences depicting a person's 
name and behaviour with no mention of group affiliation. The results showed that 
participants demonstrated more elaborate or on-line processing under the 
impression and memory instructional sets and less under the comprehension 
instructional set. Results were not as straightforward in the group condition where 
group affiliation had been added to the sentences. The authors had hypothesized 
that memory-based processing would be observed for group targets (as was 
proposed by Sanobmatsu, Sherman & Hamilton, 1987) with the memory and 
comprehension instructional sets, white the impression set would cali fo r on-line 
processing. However, they found that participants stil l used on-line processing 
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even in the memory instructional set, thus showing that on-line processing stiJl 
occurs with group targets . 
Besicles contributing to the distinction between on-line and memory-based 
judgrnents of social targets, the results of this experiment also contribute to the re 
research by showing that the effect was found for groups and for individuals in the 
comprehension set condition and that these appear to be memory-based. However, 
in the memory and the impression set for group targets, the re found revealed that 
participants formed on-line impressions, which are contrary to what was expected. 
The authors suggest that without expLicit directive instructions (as in the memory 
set instructions) behavioral information about group members leads to sorne 
spontaneous trait extractions or on-line processing. eonsequently, this study 
demonstrates that re effects can be obtained for groups and for individuals using 
bath cognitive processing strategies ( on-line and memory-based) and the results do 
not support the explanation proposed by Sanbonmatsu, Sherman and Hamilton 
( 1987). In effect, the authors suggest that the two cognitive strategies should be 
considered as part of a continuum rather than as dichotomous. 
We would tend to concur with this analysis and suggest that even with explicit 
instructions these two cognitive processes cannat be mutually exclusive. However, 
the task is to determine if one has precedence over the other in specifie conditions 
(e.g. impression or memory task). Since impressions tend to stem from global 
evaluative judgments at the time of encoding (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), we could 
surmise that stimuli about individuals will be processed on-line and that 
participants will try to integrate the information from various behaviours into a 
· single coherent impression. As was shawn by McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton 
(1994), on-line cognitive processing would lead to better recall and recognition 
scores and a greater re effect. On the other hand, memory-based cognitive 
processing should lead to better recall and recognition for the majority group, 
thereby reducing or eliminating the re effect. Our study will attempt to back up 
these fmdings and attempt to determine if the same findings occur when stimuli are 
presented by visual media and whether they persist, increase or decrease over time. 
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In addition to measuring ICs for different instructional sets, McConnell, 
Sherman and Hamilton (1994) also wanted to determine if the phenomenon would 
be altered by primacy or recency at the time of presentation. Furthermore, they 
wanted to determine whether a "post-encoding" condition would produce the sarne 
kind of bias in the perception of groups. Through a series of experiments, they 
investigated the effect of presentation arder of the salient stimulus. They rnanaged 
. to produce the IC phenomenon in three conditions: where a salient stimulus was 
presented at 1) the beginning (primacy loaded), 2) end (recency loaded) or 3) when 
equally distributed (neutra!). No significant differences were found in the strength 
of the ICs between the three conditions, suggesting that presentation arder has no 
influence. 
Since no differences were observed in the strength of the illusory conelation 
effect between the three conditions, the authors stated that although a stimulus may 
not be distinctive at the time of presentation, it could become distinctive as new 
-information about groups is being processed. In other words, they stipulated that a 
post-encoding (similar to on-line) process occurred whereby information is not 
simply read and stored becoming static in memory, rather, it is processed in a 
continuous manner such that subsequent information may trigger prior information 
to be reconsidered, reviewed and re-assimilated in a different way. Hence, the 
authors proposed that ICs could be formed as new information was processed. We 
could add that post-encoding is similar to the concept of differentiai processing 
(Hunt, & Worthen, 2006), in that information being processed on-line, remains so 
fresh that it is 'revisited ', as new information is being perceived. This ' revisited ' 
information, combined with novel information forms the basis ofjudgment. 
Memory-based information is therefore not solicited or necessary for ajudgment to 
occur. 
The notion of post-encoding undermines current thought that ICs depend on 
memory for certain information. A nurnber of researchers do not support a post-
encoding theory (see: McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; 
Zadney & Gerard, 1974; Hamilton and Giffard ( 1976, Experiment 2), and Srul1 & 
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Wyer, 1980). They have shown evidence that prior information stored in memory 
is strongly implanted and is not easily dislodged by subsequent stimuli. However, 
it is not clear that this would exclude the possibility that although in certain 
conditions perceivers may rely on their memory for the initial stimulus, they also 
revise their impression and are capable of making a global judgment that is not 
based on recall of specifie data. Srull & Wyer ( 1980) proposed such a dual process 
to exp lain anomalies in impression formation where differentjudgments about the 
same target would occur depending upon whether or not perceivers actively tried to 
recall specifie information about the target. In general, there are still diverging 
views of how and why the re phenomenon occurs. 
A parallel concern has been to determine whether !Cs occur at the time that a 
. stimulus is encoded or at the time that it is retrieved. This is an important issue 
because ifiCs occur when information is encoded, it could mean that a bias is 
present as information is initial! y processed, thus creating a potential for false 
memories and eliminating the possibility of ever recovering a trace of the original 
information. On the other hand, ifiCs occm at retrieval it would imply that the 
stimulus information is initially processed and encoded correctly and therefore 
ultimately retrievable, but that a bias occurs for other reasons. Research done by 
Fied ler, Hemmeter and Hofmann (1984), and Hamilton, Dugan and Trolier (1985, 
Experiment l , 2), have demonstrated that ICs can indeed occur white information 
is being encoded. 
The view that distinctiveness based ICs are present at encoding has been 
accepted for over 30 years (see Hamilton and Rose, 1980). The premise concerning 
distinctiveness-based ICs for group targets is that infrequent or otherwise salient 
items benefit from more extensive encoding at the time of presentation, (Hastie and 
Park, 1986). These authors also propose that memory-based judgments are rare 
because "when a new judgment must be made in the absence of perceptually 
available evidence, subjects rely on previous judgments rather than remembered 
evidence." (Hastie and Park, 1986, p.263), as they would need for a true memory-
based judgment. Once again, we lack information about individual targets on this 
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matter, although we suspect that the same holds true, as suggested by Srull & Wyer 
(1980) in their dual processing mode! mentioned above. 
To this point, we have looked at !Cs from different angles. We have seen that 
the effect can occur with both groups and individuals. We know that different 
instruction sets can affect the phenomenon and we know that different measures 
are used to identify the effect (trait ratings, attribution, frequency & recognition). 
We have seen that the !Cs can occur with verbal and visual stimuli that were 
devoid of conventionalized social connotations and that different degrees of 
cognitive load do not seem to alter the effect. We have also seen that a debate 
seems to exist on whether ICs occur through memory-based or on-line cognitive 
processing and we have suggested that these two cognitive processes are part of a 
continuum rather than independent from each other. We would now like to pursue 
with concepts that relate to memory. As such, we will look at heuristics as weil as 
the network madel ofmemory. Finally, we will consider the need for adding two 
new variables to IC research: free recall as weil as testing after a substantial delay 
oftime. These will be introduced in the context of studying the link between the 
bias inherent to re effects and the false memories that could stem from this 
phenomenon. 
Heuristics 
There is a wide body of research stating that salient information (i.e. cell D, in 
this experiment) is better encoded and remembered. For the most part, studies 
have concluded that salient stimuli are more available in memory making them 
easily retrievable and thus more prone to such biases as illusory conelations. 
Research on heuristics has regularly addressed the issue of the availability of 
stimuli in memory. Tversky & Kahneman, ( 1973) developed the concept of 
heuristics (availability, representati veness, anchoring, framing, simulation, etc.) to 
explain how humans use strategies for makingjudgments under uncertainty and 
how these strategies lead to error or bias. The social perceiver is vi1tually always 
using heuristics as a means of processing infonnation rapidly and efficient! y. The 
availability heuristic is a cognitive mechanism used to evaluate the frequency or 
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likelihood of an event based on how quickly instances or associations come to 
mind. These authors note that when examples or associations are readily accessible 
and easily brought to mind, it inflates frequency estimates. 
The availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) is mentioned quite 
comm:orùy in the IC literature since it involves frequency or probability judgments. 
Sernin and Fiedler (1996) affirrn that people generally overestimate the probability 
of an event if concrete instances ofthat event are easily accessible in memory. It is 
therefore easy to understand why ICs, the availability heuristic, and salience of 
stimuli are oftenjointly discussed in the literature. 
The availability heuristic is used to explain various effects in the perception of 
individuals and social groups (e.g. Taylor, 1982). Minority groups and infrequent 
behaviours stand out and thus tend to be more distinctive. Hamilton and Giffard 
(1976) even argue that the availability heuristic could underlie the formation of 
stereotypes. Sherman and Corty (1984) went even further and stated that heu ristics 
are not necessarily confined to group judgrnents; they are ubiquitous to most 
situations where cognitive processing is insufficient for the task being completed. 
On the other hand, Pouliot and Cowen's (2000) fmdings did not concur with 
evidence regarding the availability heuristic account ofiCs because it was the non-
salient, more frequent category of abjects that was better remembered. 
Other research on illusory correlations ( e.g. MacDonald, 2000) suggests that 
the representativeness heuristic, rather than the availability heuristic, plays a role in 
the IC phenomena. This heuristic is defined as the tendency to assess the 
probability that '!-stimulus belongs to a particular class by judging the degree to 
which that event corresponds to an appropriate mental mode! (Sernin, Fiedler, 
1996). The judgment process using this heuristic involves determining the 
similarity between the sample event and sorne model representation, or prototype 
of the class, category or population to which the event is considered to belong. [n 
an impression formation task, however, we must also consider the incongruency 
effect (Hastie and Kumar, 1979) wruch produces a higher recall rate for 
incongruent stimuli (behaviours), i.e. behaviours that are not at first glanee 
34 
DBIC and social stimuli 
representative o~ the general tendency of an individual' s behaviour. Coats and 
Smith (Ch 14 in Hunt & Worthen, 2006) add that that incongruent information is 
processed more in an attempt to reconcile it with the expectation that target 
information should be coherent. In this sense, the incongruent information may 
strongly influence or dominate the mental mode! and make behaviours from that 
incongruous category seem more representative of the target than they would 
otherwise be. 
The availability and representativeness heuristics both lead to systematic biases 
arid errors in judgment and decision-making. However, it is also possible to discern 
their differences and to associate each with the two different types ofiCs. The 
availability heuristic, which pertains to the ease at which events come to mind, is 
associated with distinctiveness based ICs where salient stimuli are processed at a 
deeper leve! and therefore recalled more easily. On the other hand, the 
representativeness heuristic, which is said to rely on prototypes for judgments, 
shares a similarity with expectancy based illusory correlations (i.e. judging or 
categorizing someone based on a madel in memory). One must however note that 
bath heuristics apply to a wide range of stimuli and that they are used to explain a 
· variety of errors and biases in cognitive functioning (Semin & Fiedler, 1996; 
Sherman & Corty, 1984). The incongruency effect is also linked with expectancy-
based res since incongruent stimuli triggers a process by which the perceiver 
attempts to incorporate that information into the existing impression. This process 
can include the retrieval of previously acquired information from long-term 
memory into working memory. As such, old and new stimuli are simultaneously 
considered (processed), which could result in a direct link between them in 
memory (Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 1996). 
Research on memory has clearly demonstrated that participants spend more 
time at encoding and are better at remembering salient or incongruent behaviour 
(Hastie, 1984; Srull, 1981 ; Wyer & Gordon, 1982). Con·espondingly, Shennan 
and Hamilton, (1994) studied the associative network mode! ofperson memory in 
.the context of impression formation. The mode! assumes that a target persan is 
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represented in memory by a central node, to which items of information become 
attached as they are encoded. The mode! also assumes that this associative activity 
occurs only during the encoding of impression-incongruent behaviours and not 
during the reception of impression congruent behaviours. Taking more time to 
process incongruent items would therefore leave a longer memory trace and in so 
doing, would make it easier to recall. As was suggested above concerning the 
incongruency effect, the authors found that incongruent information was processed 
longer and had a dominant memory trace. 
Another issue involving the associative network model pertains to the type of 
recall used for the dependent measures. Most studies exploring the issue ofiCs 
have used cued recall as one oftheir dependent measures in the so-called 
attribution task. Seta and Seta, (1990) have argued that :free and cued recall may 
employ different cognitive mechanisms. For instance, during free recall , 
participants are free to generate any idiosyncratic or ad-hoc eues that come to 
mind. Recalling a behaviour may itselfbecome a eue to recall another. 
Consequently, the associative links in memory may be solicited in any number of 
ways. On the other hand, cued recall may limit the search through an associative 
network causing participants to terminate the search much sooner (Seta and Seta, 
1990). Free recall therefore would be an important measure to consider in IC 
research and it may add external validity since it is more similar to the process 
typically used in daily life. 
Other memory issues are also pertinent to the IC paradigm. Abundant evidence 
from research studies and from everyday observations shows people that false 
information can make intrusions into memory and be considered true. Humans 
have a tendency to confuse factual observations with expectations, imaginations 
wishes or even dreams. Incorrect inferences are drawn from leading questions and 
suggestive exchanges. Mistakes, even if corrected, are sometimes overridden. 
Alternatively, conections are interpreted as our own originaljudgment and finally, 
our encoding processes selectively confirm the sort of hypothesis that fits our own 
schema and stereotypical beliefs (Fiedler, Walther, Armbruster, Fay & Naumann, 
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1996). These memory intrusions may not appear to play a major role in 
. distinctiveness based res since, theoretically, the stimuli presented are new to the 
participant. However, even with novel stimuli, certain pre-existing schemas will be 
activated by the stimuli that are presented. For example, in presenting a picture of 
a person engaged in a specifie behaviour like washing dishes, the participant may 
have never seen the person before, but he most certainly has the prototype for that 
type of person and/or a schema for that type of behaviour. In fact, multiple 
schemas for the target person may be activated in the participant, ranging from 
schemas for physical characteristics, posture or facial expressions to schemas for 
envirorin:i.ental factors such as the physicallocation or the company he keeps. 
Similarly, the behaviours performed by this new person, unless very rare, will 
likely have been witnessed ftrsthand or vicariously (e.g. through the media) by the 
participant. Therefore, novel stimuli in re experiments are in reality, a new 
combination of old information and therefo re intrusions are al ways a possibility . 
Dependent measures like free and cued recall could lead to different types of 
·intrusion errors. Using a network mode! to describe the processes, free recall 
intrusion errors could stem fro m any nurnber of associations made by a participant, 
whereas intrusions for cued recall would likely be guided from what was proposed. 
In fact, in the case of the attribution task used in re research, the intrusions could 
all be misattributions of behaviour to the wrong actor (rather than an imagined or 
invented behaviour). Although both types of intrusions are cognitive, the fust 
stems from information contained within the person and the second stems from 
suggested information, creating links that may not have been considered were they 
not proposed. Eyewitness testimony research has demonstrated that leading 
questions, like cued recall, lead to more false alarms (Fiedler et al, 1996, Steffens, 
& Mecklenbrauker, 2007). Likewise, using fo ils, as can be done in a cued recall 
task, may "implant" information in the person ' s network of links. When a 
participant is presented with a cued recall task where the assignment is to 
recognize the previously presented stimuli, he will have to consider ali the stimulus 
material and decide whether they were part of the original set. According to Loftus 
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(1975), post-event suggestions create transient representations in memory, which 
are then incorporated in the representation of the original information. Even if the 
participant recognizes the foi! and dis misses it, traces of transient representation 
may remain and continue to affect memory in subsequent recall andjudgments. 
The concept oftransient representations in memory does not yet seem to have 
been applied to IC research. Research is usually conducted by presenting 
participants with a series of stimulus material and taking dependent measures 
shortly thereafter. Applying Loftus's (1975) theory oftransient representations 
would mean that subsequent testing, say one week later, might affect memory for 
the stimuli . In fact, no research on ICs has tested whether false memories develop 
because of prior biased judgments. Loftus posits that trace information may affect 
subsequent memory, but it remains to be seen if such traces are strong enough to 
actually bias memory when using the IC paradigm. In essence, the present research 
seeks to determine ifthe IC effect that is formedjust after the initial presentation of 
the stimuli (i.e. at Tl), would be strong enough to create intrusions (i.e. false 
memories) one week later (i.e. at T2) . Such a finding would indicate that false 
memories could perpetuate or increase with time. On the other hand, time may 
have the opposite effect on illusory correlations. Since the ratio of majority to 
minority stimuli presented is two to one, time may in fact augment the probability 
that participants remember stimuli from the majority category. As previously 
stated, no study has yet included a time component in IC research. The present 
study will attempt to clarify the nature of such intrusions and their relation to [Cs 
by measuring cued recall (on the attribution task testing IC effects), recognition (as 
was done by Pouliot & Cowen, 2000) and free recall (which has never been used 
before in IC research. 
Surnmarv 
At the beginning of this chapter, we presented the six main objectives of this 
research. Our first objective was to determine if we could produce the IC effect by 
using two target individuals performing positive and negative behaviour instead of 
two groups of persons or inanimate objects. Many studies that used similar 
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paradigms as the one created by Hamilton and Giffard (1976), have managed to 
produce the effect. The one previous study that presented stimuli depicting 
individuals did not produce the effect. Since their method differed quite 
substantially fiom the original paradigm, the present study will attempt to 
determine iftheir negative findings were due to their atypical methodology. 
The second objective is to determine the role of memory in producing re 
effects. In order to understand this more clearly, we are measuring memory directly 
and independently of our re measures. A recognition test, as used by Pouliot & 
eowen (2000) will be used again, but we are also adcling a free recall test, which 
can be compared to results for recognition and cued recall on the attribution task. 
Our third objective is to determine the course of! es over time and to see 
whether false memories develop from an initial re effect. rncluding a time factor is 
novel to the field of re research since ali studies have focused on measuring the 
effect inunediately after stimulus presentation. By re-testing re and memory one 
week later, we can see if the re effect is reduced, augmented or stable intime and 
if these changes coïncide with the development of false memories. 
Our fourth objective is to determine if the medium of presentation hasan 
influence on illusory correlations. Nearly ali of the studies in this area have used 
the verbal medium of presentation. One of the studies described above, managed to 
produce the effect by presenting photographs of inanimate abjects that had no 
social connotations. The present study will be the first to detennine if a visual 
medium has an effect on the perception, memory and attribution of positive and 
negative behaviours to individuals. 
Our fifth objective aims to determine if the illusory correlation effect which 
was found with group targets when the valence of the stimuli was reversed, extends 
to individual targets. In previous research with group targets, reversing the valence 
of the stimuli such that cel! D (i.e. minority group combined with minority 
behaviours) is positive has produced an re effect with verbal presentations. Once 
again, the present study aims to see if this effect with reversed valence generalizes 
to individual targets and to visual presentations. The present study will compare 
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results when cell D valence is positive (the so-called 'experimental salience' 
condition, ExS, in the present study) with results in the more typical or "real-
world" salience condition (RwS) where positive behaviour is the majority and cell 
D corresponqs to negative behaviour. 
Our last objective aims to determine if different task sets have an effect on the 
re phenomenon. Most studies have assumed an impression formation process 
underlies the re effect, which is rneasured by attributions and frequency estimation 
tasks comrnonly used as measures of illusory correlations. As we have seen, sorne 
researchers have stipulated that the re phenomenon is memory based whi te others 
stipulate that it is an on-line process and still others say it depends on the type of 
stimuli used (i.e. gToups or individuals). What 's more, if as proposed, both on-line 
and memory based cognitive strategies are used, it remains to be determined, 
which is predominant. By directly varying instruction and orienting participants to 
different tasks (memorizing information vs. forming an impression) we hope to 
elucidate how these different processes contribute to res and verify their impact on 
memory. 
For this study, we have devised a series of 11 hypotheses, which are listed 
below. Sorne are more general in nature; others pertain to the independent 
variables, white still others pe1iain to interaction effects. The hypotheses are 
divided in two major categories: those pertaining tore effects and those pertaining 
to memory effects. 
Hypotheses 
In arder to avoid confusion about terminology, please note that the expression 
"verbal stimuli" refers to sentences describing one of the two target persans 
performing a behaviour, e.g. "Alexis reading a book". eonversely, the expression 
''visual stimuli" refers to photogTaphs (slides transferred to Power Point and 
projected for presentation) depicting a target persan performing a behaviour, e.g. a 
slide of Alex reading a book. 
Hypotheses concerning illusory correlation effects using attribution and freguency 
estimation measures 
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General_ hypothesis for overall illusory correlation effect: 
Hl 
Using a nearly identical paradigrn to Hamilton and Gifford's (1976), but using 
two individual targets instead oftwo groups of individuals, there is an re for the 
salient target performing salient behaviour (i.e. cell "D" stimuli). Furthermore, this 
phenomenon occurs without giving participants prior instructions as to the status 
(majority or minority) of the targets or by having them speci:fically focus on one 
target in particular. 
Primary hypotheses concerning the major variables: 
Effects associated with the medium of presentation: 
H2 
Following Pouliot & eowen's (2000) findings, we predict that re effects occur 
, when using either visual or verbal stimuli. However, given the greater vividness 
and concreteness of photographs compared to sentences, we expect that visual 
stimuli reduce the re effect. 
Effects associated with the type of salience: 
H3 
As found by Hamilton and Gifford ( 1976, experiments 1&2), we predict that re 
effects occur for both real-world salience (where cell "D" contains negative 
behaviour) and experimental salience (where cell "D" contains positive behaviour). 
However, since real-world salience combines the effects of negative valence and 
distinctiveness at the same time, we expected re effects to be greater in this 
condition than in the experimental salience condition. 
Effects associated with the task set orientation: 
H4 
Following the findings of Sanbonmatsu , Sherman and Hamilton (1989), we 
predict that the re effect is stronger for the impression formation task than for the 
memory task. This is predicted because inconsistent salient information has a 
greater impact when the impression and evaluation task is explicit and participants 
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do not have pre-determined expectations about the targets, as shawn in Stangor and 
McMillan's (1992) meta-analysis. 
Effects associated with time: 
H5 
We expect the re effect to increase at time two compared to time one. Since 
memory decreases over time, we surmise that participants would remember fewer 
numbers of items at T2. However, since salient stimuli should theoretically be 
better remembered, they should have a greater influence than non-salient stimuli at 
T2, thus facilitating an re effect. 
Secondary hypotheses concerning interaction effects: 
Two-way interaction 
H6 
A two-way interaction between task set (impress ion vs. memory) and salience 
. type (ExS vs. RwS) is predicted because the stronger effects of salient negative 
behaviour (compared to salient positive behaviour) should be yet more pronounced 
when there is an impression task which should produce more of an re effect than 
the opposite combination (positive salience and memory task). 
Three-way interaction 
H7 
A three-way (task set x salience type x time) interaction is expected since 
decreases in memory occurring at T2 would represent a further increase in the 
differences on re measures that had previously been observed at time one. 
Memory effects using recall and recognition measures 
It should be noted that when prior research has exp lained re effects in terms of 
memory, the tendency has been to suggest that salient st imuli are more available at 
the time ajudgment is made (i .e. memory-based impress ions) . Aside from Pouliot 
& eowen (2000) there has been little or no mention and 1 or measure offalse 
alarms. As previously stated, the strongest arguments in favow· of memory as a 
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cause ofiCs should consider botb hits and false alarms. It is worthwhile noting that 
although the attribution task is in effect a cued recall task (and therefore a memory 
measure) it does not permit one to look at both hits and false alarms because in that 
task the two are not independent, i.e. each time there is a miss in cell B (lowering 
the hit rate for that cell) there is automatically a false alarm in cell D because the 
false alarrns indeed result from the misses in the adjacent cell. In contrast, the data 
from the recognition task and the recall task do not suffer from this shortcoming, 
i.e. a miss in one cell does not automatically become a false alarm in the adjacent 
cell (and vice-versa). 
Hypotheses concerning the major variables: 
Effects associated with the medium of presentation: 
H8 
As was observed by Pouliot and Cowen (2000) we expect that participants are 
significantly better at overall detection of false alarms in the visual condition. 
These authors also found better foi! detection (i.e. less false alarms) for the less 
frequent stimulus category. However, they did not measure false alarms rates with 
regard to individual cells. In the present study we can measure false alarms rates in 
recognition as well as confabulation and errors of commission in recall in each of 
the four cells. Once again, the strongest evidence that IC is based on memory 
would be seen in a higher hit rate and false alarm rate for cel! "D". 
Effects associated with the type of salience: 
H9 
Given that negative behaviour is generally more influential in social perception 
and judgments, we expected real-world salience to produce a higher hit rate for ce l! 
"D" when compared to the hit rate for the same cel! in the experimental salience 
condition. In a similar vein and as expressed in H-8 we expect the false alarm rate 
for cel! "D" in the real-world salience condition to be higber than in the 
experimental salience condition. 
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Effects associated with the task: 
H10 
Prior research has clearly shawn that recall of information is better when it is 
presented in an impression formation task as opposed to a memory task (Hamilton 
& Rose, 1980). However, false alarms have not been studied to any great extent. 
Since we expected re effects to be greater for the in1pression formation task, the 
strongest evidence that re is memory-based would be found in an increased false 
alarms rate and increased hit-rate for cell "D", which is what we anticipate. 
E.ffects associated with lime: 
Hll 
Previous stuclies have shown that recall decreases intime (see Fiske &Taylor, 
1991). We hypothesized that this experiment's recall measure would also show a 
decrease with time, more so than for the recognition measure. This effect should be 
yet greater for non-salient stimuli. eonversely, hit rates for cell ''D" were expected 
to be proportionally higher at T2 compared to Tl more so than the other cells in the 
array . False alarms were also hypothesized to be greater at T2, when an re effect 
was observed at time l. In other words, there will be a proportional increase in 
. false memories at T2 associated with the exaggerated judgments regarcting cell "D" 
items at Tl. Recall measures should be more sensitive to these influences than the 
recognition measures. 
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METHOD 
Paradigm 
Throughout the text, we have mentioned that we will be using the paradigm 
developed by Hamilton and Giffard (1976) . We made four slight modifications to 
the paradigm. First, Hamilton and Giffard (1976) used 39 sentences in their 
stimulus array. We chose to use 36 stimuli instead of39 . This decision is also 
supported by a number of facts. First, as can be seen in the meta-analysis by 
Mullen and Johnson (1990), more than 35% of the studies cited used 36 stimuli 
instead of 39. They do not mention anywhere that this affected results. In addition, 
Pouliot and Cowen (2000) used 36 stimuli in their array. Since the current study is 
partly inspired by their initial attempt to measure recognition as well as ICs, we 
thought it would be wise to maintain their choice of 36 stimuli since we will also 
be examining the role of memory in producing IC effects. Second, by using 36 
stimuli we can maintain a neat 2:1 ratio for both of the two dimensions in the 2x2 
array, whereas using 39 stimuli would create a ratio of2:1 when comparing actors 
(cel! A vs. C or B vs. D) but a ratio of 9:4 when comparing majority and minority 
behaviour. Thus, with 36 stimuli, there is symmetry for the two dimensions and 
individual comparisons of majority and minority cells on either dimension would 
be based on an equivalent number of stimuli in the cells being compared. While 
doing this we wanted to preserve the mininmm amount of four stimuli in cell D, 
which appears in ail studies using this paradigm. Therefore, if cell D was to have 
four stimuli , the 2:1 ratio determined the stimulus quantity for the ether cells of 
this more elegant design as we can see in table 2.1 below. 
The second modification was for stimulus type, as dictated by one ofthe main 
obj ectives of this study. Instead of presenting different members from two groups 
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of people, each of whom behaves either positively or negatively, we presented 
different behaviours oftwo individuals, each behaviour being either positive or 
negative. 
Table 2.1 
Two by two (2x2) distribution of behaviours for each ac tor 
Majority Behaviour Minority Behaviour 
(majB) (minB) 
Majority Actor Cel! A Cell B 
(majA) 16 stimuli 8 stimuli 
Minority Actor Cell C Cell D 
(minA) 8 stimuli 4 stimuli 
The third modification involved the instruction set. We deleted any mention 
pertairling to the quantity or quality of stimuli about the two individuals that were 
going to be presented. This modification was included so that participants would 
not fonn an initial bias before viewing the stimuli and so that the stimulus array 
would be as close as possible to " real-world" stimuli where people would not 
necessarily be cued into witnessing stimuli . 
Our last modification was to give participants an orientation toward impression 
formation or toward memorizing information by asking them to perform a 
consolidation task a:fter each stimulus was presented. This modification was based 
on a method employed by Fiedler, Russer and Grarnm (1993) who used it to 
control the way in which participants cognitivel y processed the information, which 
was precisely our goal here. 
Finally, we added a time component to this research. One week later 
participants were tested again for IC effects and for memory of the stimuli in the 
original array. Thus, with a comparable paradigm as the one used by Hamilton and 
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Giffard (1976) we devised an experiment where ICs could be measured for 
individuals in a repeated measures design. As such, we have a 2 (visual (Vis) 
medium vs. Verbal (Ver) medium) x 2 (impression (Imp) task set vs. Memory 
(Mem) task set) x 2 (real-world salience (RwS) vs. experimental salience (ExS) 
design as depicted in table 2.2. In half of the groups, the 36 stimuli were presented 
verbally, whereas in the other halfthe stimuli were presented visually. Each of 
these conditions were divided into two sub groups, one in which the consolidation 
task oriented participants toward fonning an impression ofthe two actors, the other 
in which the consolidation task oriented participants to memorizing the information 
about the two actors. For each combination of mediwn and task set, half the 
partie<ipants were presented with 36 stimuli in which the salient (minority) 
behaviour of both actors was negative, corresponding to the real-world salience 
condition (since in general people expect others to be good). The other half of 
participants were presented with 36 stimuli in which the salient behaviour was 
positive, corresponding to the experimental salience condition (ExS). This 
condition was invented in the classic experiment of Hamilton and Giffard ( 1976 
exp. 2). It is contrary to people's general expectations about others' behaviour and 
is not typically encountered by the average person in his day-to-day !ife in the real 
world. Consequently, there were eight experimental conditions. However, in 
order to control for the possibility that the actors' names or faces might create an 
experimental e:ffect independently of the behaviours or the ir proportions, we 
coLmterbalanced the groups. As such, the design (2x2x2) was tripled and the 
experiment req uired tes ting 24 groups in total. 
Participants 
Participants consisted of292 English speaking CEGEP students. The dean wa 
contacted and asked for permission to conduct this study. Permission was official! y 
granted by the college's deontology committee. Included with the request was a 
general surnmary of the study as well as a detailed account of the method and the 
procedure. After obtaining a written authorization to col lect data that was a lid for 
two years, we contacted two psychology teachers at that school who agreed to tend 
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a hand for this project. The project was fully described and they allowed the 
experiment to be conducted during class time. 
Table 2.2 
Experimental conditions of study 
* Consolidation task (impression or memory) only at time one 
Time 1 * 
Groups/ N Medium Task Salience AU dep. 
Time 2 
All dep. 
conditions measures measures 
19 Ver Imp RwS ..J -.J 
2 22 Ver Imp ExS 
-.J -.J 
3 20 Ver Mem RwS 
-.J -.J 
4 20 Ver Mem ExS 
-.J -.J 
5 24+20 Vis Imp RwS 
-.J -.J 
6 26+25 Vis Imp ExS 
-.J -.J 
7 18+28 Vis Me rn RwS -.J -.J 
8 41+29 Vis Me rn ExS -.J -.J 
TTL N 292 
Note: we have two sets ofN' s for gro ups 5-8. These represent eight classes 
tested in the visual conditions. This is part of a counterbalancing procedure, which 
is explained in the procedure section. 
It was arranged with the participating teachers for the experimenter to be 
present at the beginning of class and ask students if they wanted to participate in 
the study. They were told that the study was about social perception (see appendix 
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H). It was clearly stated that participation was voluntary, independent of cow-se or 
grade and that they were free to end their participation at any time without 
prejudice. The teacher also corroborated this information. As a means oftrying to 
maximize student collaboration and to increase the probability they would return 
for the second phase a week iater, they were informed that upon completion of the 
study, they would be eligible to a $50 dollar cash prize draw. 
Most students agreed to participate in the study in ali the classes that were 
solicited. In fact, of ali classes, only three students did not initial! y wish to 
participate. Each ciass represented one experimental condition. The classes were 
mostly comprised of25-30 students. Each read and signed a consent form (see 
appendix A). The ratio of females to maies was 2:1 , and the age range was from 17 
to 25, averaging 18.50 yrs. This ratio is commonly found in psychology classes. 
Apparatus 
Construction of stimulus material (photographs and sentences) 
Pre testing enabled us to find two male actors that were distinct from each other 
but of approximately the same age and bui1d. In order to verify this assertion, a 
pic ture of each actor was shown to twenty j udges who were unaware of the present 
study or of the actor's potential ro1e in this research. The sample pictw-es of the 
two actors were of face and upper body facing front. The actors adopted a neutra! 
pose (i.e. not smiling nor frowning) , similar to what is asked for a passport picture. 
Students were asked to rate the actors on a series of four traits (Intelligent, 
confident, suspicious and shy) which was inspired from Hamilton and Gifford 
(1976). The twenty students were also asked how confident they were about being 
able to differentiate the two actors from each other. 
Subsequently, a series of more than 120 photographs was taken of the two 
actors and presented to another group of twenty j udges. The ir task was to identify 
the behaviow-s depicted on each photograph. In addition, the judges were asked to 
rate the likeability of the behaviour using a nine-point Likert-type scale going from 
-4 (extremely dislikeabie) to +4 (extremely likeable). This permitted detection and 
exclusion of ambiguous photographs, i.e. those rated between -1 and + l and those 
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rated as extreme, (i.e. -4 or +4). Deleting photographs that were rated extreme or 
ambiguous was done to respect the original stimuli presented by Hamilton and 
Gifford (1976) as well as other research done in this field. Our interest went toward 
showing that ICs are adaptive, common and can be generalized in society. 
From these 120 photographs, 48 were chosen for each actor; 24 showed the 
actor perfonning a positive behaviour and 24 showed him performing a negative 
behaviour. From the two sets of 48 photos, we constructed subsets of 36 such that 
24 photos showed 1 actor and 12 showed the other actor. The matching sentences 
were used for the verbal condition of the study. The sentences came from the 
picture descriptions given by the 20-person group during the pre-test. The 
· behavioural descriptions were incorporated into a simple declarative sentence such 
as "Alexis break.ing a CD" or "Chris is dusting the TV". Two independent judges 
compared the sentences with the corresponding photographs to certify that the 
simple declarative sentences matched. There was perfect inter-rater reliability. 
Having the 48 photographs or sentences, of which 12 or 24 could be chosen for a 
stimulus set allowed sufficient stimulus material to prepare the extra sets needed 
for counterbalancing. 
To insure a lack of bias in the presentation, the 36 stimuli were divided into a 
stratified random arder. That is, four blocks of nine stimuli were created such that 
each black respected the overall proportional representation of the four stimulus 
sub-categories in the total set (i .e. four from cell "A," two from cells "B" and "C," 
and one from cel! "D"). The particular stimuli and their order within any black 
were randomly determined. 
Testing instruments: computer, projector, screen, questionnaires 
The CEGEP was ki nd enough to provide a computer and a projector for testing 
purposes. An HP Pentium II desktop computer and Canon projector (model LV-
X4) mounted on a rolling cabinet was available for each classroom used for testing. 
Each room was also equipped with a roll down projection screen measuring 
approximately six square meters (2.5m. x 2.5m.). The size of the picture projected 
on the screen was approximately one meter by one point three meter, (1 x 1.3). 
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This was more than adequate for the small rooms in which the experiment was 
conducted. The font size for the sentences was 44 and we used a Times New 
Roman letter type. The classrooms were eight meters deep by six meters wide and 
the projection screen was on the six meter wall in the front of the classroom. The 
classroom lights were dimrned at the front when the stimuli were being presented. 
Each participant had an unobstructed view of the screen and each reported having 
no difficulty either reading the sentences or clearly seeing the information on the 
pictures. lt should be remembered that this screen size was perfectly adequate for 
viewing in this room since it was installed exactly for the purpose of permitting ail 
students to see classroom presentations when using a computer and projector. 
Stimuli were presented on slides created using Microsoft Office 2003 Power Point. 
Booklets 
Ail data for the dependent measures were co llected on paper. Each participant 
was given a booklet consisting of 812" x 11" sheets of paper stap led together (see 
appendix A through G). A consent form was used as a caver page and participants 
were asked to read it as the booklets were being handed out. Participants were told 
..to keep the booklets unopened in front of them. Once ali the booklets were 
distributed, the experimenter read the consent form aloud to the participants, 
answered their questions and then asked those who wished, to sign the consent 
form. Once again, participants were assured that leaving or not participating would 
ca1,1se no prejudice. All booklets were printed with a laser quality printer/copier. 
To insure anonymity, participants had only to write their names and sign on the 
consent form. No other sheet contained participants' nominal information. At time 
two, a second booklet was given, which included a title page, so they could write 
the ir name on it. Once the questionnaires from Tl and T2 were matched , the 
consent form from Tl and the title page from T2 were removed. A ballot form 
located at the bottom of the last page was also removed (eut out) from the book.! et. 
To insure anonymity and unbiased treatment of the questionnaires, the persan 
matching the questionnaires and cutting out the ballot form was independent from 
the experimenter and independent from the persan involved in data entry. 
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Dependent measures 
Four dependent measures of which two traditionally measure re (attribution of 
behaviours to actors and frequency estimation of minority behaviour) and two 
traditionally measure memory (recall and recognition), were obtained twice. These 
measures were first obtained shortly after the stimulus presentation (i.e. at the same 
sitting) and then ·one week later. Repeated measures are cornmon in memory 
research but non-existent in IC research. The second testing allowed us to 
determine, as previously mentioned, if false memories develop over tirne, 
particularly because of prior biased judgments. 
Attribution 
The attribution task (see appendix F), asked participants to read in a 
randomized order, descriptions of each behaviour performed in the original 
stimulus set. Two columns appeared next to the 36 descriptions where participants 
had to put a check mark in the colurnn assigned to the actor whom they thought 
performed the behaviour. 
Frequency estimation 
Also common in re research, participants were administered the frequency 
estimation task (see appendix G). In this task, participants were given the total 
number of behaviours perfonned by each actor and their task was to give the 
number of minority behaviour (stated as ' negative' for real-world condition or 
' positive ' for the experimental salience condition). The quantity they had to 
determine corresponded to cell B and cell D. 
Free recall 
The free recall task, commonly used in memory research, essentially asked 
participants to write down as many of the behaviours as they could remember from 
what was presented. Participants were presented with a sheet of paper on which 
two columns appeared; one titled "Alex," the other "Chris" (see appendix D), on 
which they wrote down in the appropriate column all the behaviours they could 
remember (i.e. who did what). If participants remembered the behaviour but not 
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the actor, they were encouraged to guess which actor did it and write it dawn in the 
appropriate column (based on McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton, 1994). 
Recognition 
In the recognition task (see appendix E), participants were asked to identify the 
sentences corresponding to the stimuli originally presented . In this task, thirty-two 
sentences were presented; sixteen sentences from the original stimulus set to which 
16 foils were added. The foils respected the same criteria used for selecting the 
original stimulus material (i.e. non-ex:treme and easily identifiable). Determination 
in the nwnber bits and foils (16 of each) was based on the quantity of stimuli for 
cel! D. Since four was a maximum quantity of behaviours in cel! D, it was 
determiued as the basis of presentation for every other cel! (i.e. 4 hits + 4 foils). 
Conserviug the original 2: 1 proportions and replacing half the behaviours with 
foils would leave two bits and two foils in cell D. The statistical representation of 
such law numbers would have made it impossible to differentiate it from error 
margins. The possibility of presenting 36 hits and 36 foi ls for a total of 72 
sentences was also considered to be dissonant with the other tasks in addition to 
making it a very tedious and lengthy exercise. 
Dependent measures at time two 
One week later, participants were again asked to fil! out the same questionnaire 
that included the four dependant measures. This time however, participants were 
not shawn the original series of36 stimuli. 
Order of presentation 
The specifie arder in which the different tasks were presented was of important 
consideration. Free recall was done first so that participants did not benefit from 
priming effects of reading behaviour descriptions used in the other tasks. The 
recognition task was chosen to fo llow because this task presented only half of the 
stimu lus set. In third place came the attribution task. This was the first time that 
participants were presented with ali the stimulus material that bad originally been 
presented. The frequency estimation task came last since thi s task required 
participants to be told of the number of stimuli presented for each actor. It was 
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estimated that this order of presentation would create the !east amount of influence, 
or bias in participant 's answers. 
Procedure 
Counterbalancing of groups (visual and verbal) 
Eight different conditions were to be tested: four in the verbal condition and 
four in the visual condition. In each condition, we counterbalanced for name and 
actor thus controlling any bias. We obtained a two-year testing permission at the 
CEGEP. We therefore planned a schedule to test four classes per term (fall and 
winter) for the two years. This meant that we could test 16 classes allowing us to 
counterbalance each of the eight groups 1 conditions with another intact group to 
complete the experiment. 
In our fust year, we tested the visual condition of the experiment. Four groups 
(see table 2.2 for N's) were presented with pictures where actor number one was 
depicted as the majority actor (i.e. 24 slides) whereas actor number two was the 
minority actor (i.e. in 12 slides). Another four classes were presented with a 
different stimulus set where actors were reversed. Actors' names were not 
superimposed with the pictures presented on the screen. Rather, each booklet 
containing the dependent measures included one page at the beginning where both 
actors' picture and names appeared. This allowed half of each group to receive 
questionnaires where actor number one was identified as Chris while the other half 
received questionnaires where actor one was identified as Alex. 
We encountered a setback during the second year of testing. We were allowed 
to test for one sem ester instead of two. For logistical reasons, we decided against 
asking another permiss ion to extend testing for another term. We therefore bad to 
di vide our four classes. Half of the participants in each class were brought into a 
.nearby classroom where a second trained experimenter, conducted the study with 
the second stimulus set. This allowed the same type of counterbalancing than in the 
visual condition. The only caveat was that the total number of participants would 
not be as high as in the visualleg of the study. 
Presentation of stimulus material 
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In the visual condition, participants were presented with a set of 36 colour 
picture slides depicting either Alex or Chris involved in either a positive or a 
negative behaviour (as depicted in table 2.1). Each slide was preceded by an 
audible ' beep', Ln arder to eue participants to look at the screen for the wh ole eight 
seconds white th_e slide was being presented. After which, a completely white slide 
(blank) would appear for another eight seconds, giving participants enough time to 
complete the consolidation task (detailed below). The same procedure was used in 
the verbal condition, except the stimulus slide contained a short sentence 
describing a particular ac tor and behaviour. ( e.g. Alex cleaned the table), also 
followed by an eight-second blank slide. 
Instructions in the different conditions 
Instructions varied by condition. For media, participants in the verbal condition 
were asked to read the sentences that were presented on the screen, whereas 
participants Ln the visual condition were asked to look at the picture being 
presented on the screen. Instructions also varied by task. After presentation of each 
slide (i.e. while the eight second blank screen was presented), participants had to 
do a consolidation task designed to promote either memory-based or impression 
based cognitive processing. Participants in the "memory" condition had to write 
down a few key words on paper provided in the booklet in order to help them 
remember what they saw or read (see appendix B). A boxed line was provided for 
every stimulus and participants were instructed to start at the top and go down the 
page one tine at a time. Instructions stipulated that both behaviour and actor were 
important. 
For the impression condition, the instructions consisted of asking participants 
to complete the sentence: 'This behaviour contributes to a _______ _ 
impression of the persan'. Participants had to write either 'positive' or ' negative ' 
after each slide. The instruction booklet (see appendix C) provided a sheet with a 
series of boxes in two adjacent colurnns that corresponded to the total number of 
answers to be given. Once the first slide was presented, participants bad to write 
either "positive" or "negative" in the top box on the left hand side of the page. 
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Each new slide had participants write their answers in the box underneath the 
previous answer. Once the first column was completed, participants started at the 
top of the second column and worked the ir way down until the task was complete. 
Participants had ample time to write in their booklets while the eight-second 
blank screen was presented. The audible 'Beep' cued participants to look back at 
the screen for the new slide. The remaining independent variable involved 
presentation of stimuli where negative behaviour was in the minority (Real World 
Salience, RwS) or where positive behaviour was in the minority (Experimental 
Salience, ExS). There were no special instructions for this condition. Participants 
had to look at the screen and complete the task. lt was the stimulus set that 
changed. 
Tasks 
The four tasks were sequentially presented in the participant's booklets. At the 
· beginning of each task, the experimenter read the instructions aloud for that 
specifie task. Participants were asked to follow along since all instructions were 
included in the ir booklets. The experimenter would then answer any questions 
pertaining to what participants had to do for that task. Subsequently, participants 
were asked to proceed with the task. Once the allotted time was over, they were 
asked to put down the ir pens or pencils and wait for further instructions. When the 
first task was completed, instructions were read aloud for the second task and so on 
until al! four tasks had been completed. We had sorne restraints about testing 
groups of people in one sitting. The risks of adding "noise" or bias such as 
participants copying answers or making comments aloud were considered. The 
instructions were clear and asked participants not to flip either forwards or 
backwards through the pages of the ir booklets. Great care was taken to alert 
participants so they wo uld not derogate from the instructions. The experimenter, 
standing at the front of the class, could easily see anyone that did not follow 
instructions. He also stressed the individual nature of the exercise. 
Time one. 
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Each class of25-30 people represented one experimental condition. 
Presentation stimuli and questionnaires were matched according to the specifie 
experimental conditions for each group. In all groups, the experimenter first 
explained the general nature of the experiment (appendix I). Each of the dependent 
measures was fully described prior to the task itself. After instructions were 
presented, students were asked to signa written consent forrn if they intended to 
continue participating and to fill out socio-demographic information (name, gender 
and age) . lt was stressed that all information and responses would remain 
completely anonyrnous. 
Participants in the visual condition were invited to turn to the next page of their 
booklets and study the two laser printed photographs provided. The photographs 
depicted the two actors who were to be subsequently presented in the stimulus 
array. The actors' names were printed on each photograph such that halfthe class 
was informed that the first actor's nan1e was Alex and the second actor's name was 
Chris, whereas the nam es were reversed for the other half of participants in that 
class, thus allowing for counterbalancing (as explained above). Participants were 
asked to study the photographs until they felt comfortable distinguishing between 
the two actors and their names. One minute was allotted for this brief study period . 
In the verbal conditions, only the names ofthe two actors had to be 
counterbalanced. To do this, approximately halfthe participants in a class were 
presented with sentences where Alex was the majority actor while the remaining 
participants fTom that class, who were in a different classroom, were presented 
with sentences where Chris was the majority actor. Determination of sub-group 
membership was determined randomly by distributing small pieces of paper 
containing either a circle or triangle and informing participants with one of the 
symbo ls to proceed to an adjoining room where they were given the appropriate 
questionnaire to permit counterbalancing. In all verbal and visual groups, general 
instructions pl us presentation of the 36 stimuli along with the appropriate 
conso lidation task ( depending upon the particular task set condition for the group, 
i. e. " impression" or" memory" took 12 minutes to complete. 
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Once the stimulus presentation and the consolidation task were completed, the 
experimenter invited participants to turn to the next page oftheir booklets and 
again read aloud the instructions for the following task where participants had to 
recall the stimuli that had just been presented. After any questions pertaining to the 
task were answered by the experimenter, participants had to write down ali they 
could remember from the presentation (appendix D). They had to recall behaviour 
as well as the actor that performed it. Participants who did not remember the actor 
were encouraged to guess which actor performed the behaviour. It took 10 minutes 
to complete this task. The last incidence of a written response being entered by a 
participant was always before the allotted time. 
Following this, the experimenter read aloud the instructions for the recognition 
ta.Sk in which participants had to read a series of 32 behaviour descriptions, half 
attributed to the majority actor, half to the minority ac tor. Half of the 16 
descriptions for each actor were in the original stimulus set presented at the 
beginning oftheexperiment and halfwere foils that closely resembled the original 
stimuli (e.g. "Alex fixed a broken toy") . The items were selected such that there 
were four hits and four foils for each of the four cells (A,B,C and D). Participants 
had to read each sentence and then say whether the behaviour was presented or not 
(see appendix E for instructions). This task took eight minutes to complete giving 
participants 15 seconds to decide about each individual stimulus. 
The experimenter then read aloud instructions for the attribution task, which 
presented the 36 behaviow·s in the original stimulus array, but this time without 
any actor associated with each behaviour. Participants had to read each behaviour 
(presented in a random order) and decide if the behaviour was done by Alex or by 
Chris. They were instructed to put a check mark in the appropriate box next to the 
behaviour (see appendix F). This was the ftrst time that participants were presented 
with the integral content of what had actually been presented on power point at the 
beginning of the experiment. It took participants nine minutes to complete this 
tas k. In other words, each of the 36 attributions of behaviours to one of the two 
actors was allotted approximately fifteen seconds. 
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The last dependent measure was determined by the frequency estimation task in 
which participants were asked to estimate the quantity of minority behaviour 
performed by each actor (appendix G). Once again, after the experimenter read the 
instructions aloud and answered questions about the task, participants were given 
the total number of stimuli performed by each actor. The ir task was to estimate the 
amount ofthese totals that were either negative behaviours (for the RwS condition) 
or positive behaviours (for the ExS condition) for each actor. These estimates 
correspond respective! y to cells B for the majority actor and cell D for the minority 
actor. It took less than 30 seconds for participants to complete this task. 
Throughout the entire experimental procedure, participants were reminded that 
this was an individual exercise, that results would be anonymous and that 
participants would not be compared to one anotber. Furthermore, participants were 
also remi.nded to concentrate on the task and not to look ahead or back in their 
booklets. The administration of the whole procedure took approximately 40 
minutes. 
Time two (one week later) 
Each participant was tested a second time one week later. At this time, 
participants were not presented the original set of36 visual or verbal stimuli. 
Instead, the experimenter began by reminding participants about the general 
guidelines of the study (appendix J). Booklets containing the recall, recognition, 
attribution and frequency estimation tasks, in that order, were again handed out. 
The same procedure was used as at time one. That is , participants were read 
instructions for each task and then asked to complete it. In contrast to time one, 
que tionnaires in the visual condition did not include pictures of the two actors; 
participants had to rely on what they remembered from the week before in order to 
complete the dependent measures. 
On the last page of the questionnaire, participants were asked to fil! out a ballot, 
which entitled them for a fifty-dollar cash prize. This was in fact the only incentive 
used to increase our chances of having participants complete both parts of the 
study. A third party (i .e. a person who was complete! y uninvolved in the study) 
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matched the questionnaires. Once the questionnaires from Tl and T2 were 
matched, consent form, title page and ballot were detached again by this third 
party. Nominal information was kept separate and under lock and key. Ballots were 
accumulated throughout the year and a draw was made at the end of each year. 
Note that all groups, (i.e. those in the visual and in the verbal conditions) were 
asked to complete the dependent measmes in a written form (i.e. pencil and paper). 
· This procedure may be construed as a compromise compared to an experimental 
procedure where those in the visual condition would be presented with 
photographs on the attribution and recognition tests. However, this procedure was 
considered advantageous because it controlled the condition by which dependent 
measures were obtained and served to replicate methods previously used in IC 
research and memory research. 
Preparation ojraw datajor analysis 
The counterbalancing procedure revealed no differences for name or for actor; 
data was therefore combined for analysis. 
The different dependent measmes required different preparation fo r data 
analysis. In the consolidation task for the impression formation condition, 
participants were required to write dawn either ' positive ' or ' negative' on their 
answer sheets. In the memory condition, participants had to write dawn a few key 
words on their sheets. Participants also had to write a few words in the recall task. 
. For these instances, we asked ajudge who was blind to the study, to rate all the 
answers given by participants. 
When checking all questionnaires for the consolidation task in the impression 
formation condition, the judge discovered three questionnaires where participants 
were apparent! y not serious in their answers. For these questionnaires, participants 
had written dawn "negative" , in a ll boxes. In another, a participant had written 
words other than what was required. These questionnaires were deleted from the 
study. The judge also verified the memory consolidation task. In this case, it was 
more difficult to determine if the words were adequate (unless flagrant) since 
participants had free choice of writing down their own key words for the stimulus 
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presented. Only one questionnaire consistently contained key words that had no 
apparent connection to the presented stimuli and it was taken out of the study. One 
thing that was cornmonly found in the memory consolidation task was that 
participants seemed to have enough time to write most of the short sentences that 
had been presented . 
With regard to the dependent measures, the recall task asked participants to 
write down what they remembered for each actor. Two independent judges verified 
each of the answers. They then compared notes to ensure uniformity. 
Approximately a dozen words had to be deciphered because they were badly 
written. A consensus was nonetheless obtained by these two judges. The other 
tasks were binary in nature and involved check marks so no interpretations were 
needed. Nonetheless, we excluded six questionnaires when entering the binary 
tasks. Sorne had not been completed to the end and sorne, again, where participants 
put check marks in only one colUlnn. 
Data was entered on an Excel 2007 worksheet. Ali data for one participant was 
entered in a single row starting with experimental group, age, sex, consolidation 
and each individual answer for every task at time one followed by ali the answers 
for time two. The written answers for the recall task were coded. By doing so, we 
diffe rentiated between 1) Hits : right behaviour right actor 2) Miss: right behaviour 
wrong actor and 3) inventions (errors of commission): when the behav iour was not 
in the original set of stimuli presented. We had original! y differentiated between 
recall misses ( errors of omission), inventions for Alex and inventions for Chris, but 
the quantities were too small for any of the categories, making any statistical test 
Lmtenable. The three types of error were therefore combined and their total 
accounted for Jess than ten percent of aU the answers for the recall tas k. These 
combined inventions and wrong answers were named Recall error. Consequently, 
the recall task was comprised of two measures; one for hits (correct ac tor and 
behaviour) and one for errors (combination of right behav iour wrong actor and 
inventions) . 
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The recognition task was also designed to provide two separate measures. The 
ftrst, Recognition hits, measured the number of correctly recognized behaviours on 
this task from a subset of four behaviours per cell in the original array. The second, 
False alarms, measured the number of incorrect identifications offoils (among four 
invented items per cel!) as having been in the original array of 36 stimuli. The next 
task in the booklet, the attribution task, provided a measure ofthe rate of correct 
attributions of behaviour to each actor and each behaviour category. We named 
this measure attribution hits, but our interest is really in misattributions, i.e. the 
misses in any given cell that, because of the forced choice nature of this task, 
automatically become errors in the adjacent cell for the other actor. Finally, in the 
frequency estimation task, after being given the total number of behaviours for 
each actor, participants estimated the number ofbehaviours for each that were in 
the minority (these are by defmition the negative behaviours in RwS and the 
positive behaviours in ExS). This measure was named Frequency bits, although 
clearly the numbers obtained can be in error, i.e. either overestimates or 
underestimates of the true number of minority behaviours. 
To surnmarize, there are in fact six different measures obtained from the 
responses on the four tasks: for recall we have bits and errors, for recognition we 
have hits and false alarms; for attribution we have hits (or the reciprocal, which is 
misses) and for frequency estimation we have "bits" as perceived by the 
participant. Ali measures were transformed into proportions. For example, a 
participant who correctly estimated the frequency of the minority acter performing 
the minority behaviour (cel! D) to be 4 (out of the possible 4) was given a score of 
1.0 or 100%. Likewise, a participant who attributed three out of twelve behaviours 
to the minority acter performing the majority behaviour was given a score of 0.25 
or 25%. A total of292 questionnaires were retained for analysis. 
Test of asswnptions for parametric analyses and normality 
Testing went according to what is presented in table 2.2. Ail participants in one 
class were tested for one condition. The first class to be tested was visual-
impression-real-world theo visual- impression-experimental salience and so on. 
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We followed the order as presented in table 2.2, except that we did the visual 
conditions first. 
It would be difficult to state that participants were randomly assigned since a 
who le class took part in one condition. Nevertheless, there was no experimenter 
bias in determining who the participants in any given class were. In addition, we 
had no control over the classes that were arranged for us. In essence, the 
randomness of the participants encompassed the class as a group and not each 
individual in the class. 
All of the data were comprised of continuous variables and distributions for 
each variable were submitted to univariate normality tests. It was found that three 
specifie measures did not meet the homogeneity of variance criteria for ANOVA, 
whereas three others did. Log transformations were therefore do ne on Recall error, 
Recognition ofHits and False Alarms. Post- hoc tests were done using McNamar's 
test, (Wonnacott, T.H. and Wonnacott R.J 1991). 
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RESULTS 
This study is concerned with the re effect as found using the classic Hamilton 
and Gifford (1976) paradigm. In order to test the hypotheses concerning the Ie 
. effect, it is necessary to compare the actor who appears less :frequently, i.e. the 
minority actor (MinA) with the actor who appears more frequently, i.e. the 
majority actor (MajA) with regard to the infrequent or minority behaviour category 
(MinB). At the same time, the analogous comparison with regard to the majority 
. behaviour category (MajB) serves as a control in the attribution task. As al ways, 
re effects are measured in cell D compared to cell B. The comparison of cell e vs. 
A is mainly used as a control. That is, we could not attest to an re effect if results 
for the contro l cel ls, i.e. for the majority behaviour category, are similar to the 
results forD vs. B (the comparison for the minority behaviour category). 
For ease and clarity, instead of referring to cells in terms of the combination of 
actor and behaviom type, such as "majority actor, majority behaviom" (MajA, 
MajB), we will refer to them as cells A, B, e and D as presented in table 2.1. It is 
understood that a statement such as "the mean recall for cel! D" refers to the mean 
recall of the stimuli associated with that cel!. Since the cells had different amounts 
of stimuli , data were almost uniformly transformed into proportions with regard to 
expected values for a given cell or combination of cells. Finally, any statistic 
beyond a three-way interaction is not included here and is treated as error variance. 
There are seven hypotheses that relate to the two measures commonly used in 
re research (frequency estimation & attribution) and there are four hypotheses tbat 
relate to two other measures commonly used in memory research (recall and 
recognition, distinguishing between hits and errors or false alarms for both 
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measures). For each of the hypotheses concerning IC effects, we will first present 
results from the frequency estimation and then from the attribution task. 
Hypotheses that relate to frequency estimate and attribution measure 
In the frequency estimation task, participants were given the total quantity of 
behaviours performed by each actor and then asked to write down the quantity of 
minority behaviours that were presented for each of them (i.e. cells B and D). Note 
that cells A and C cannot be used for the frequency estimation task since they are 
totally determined by the values in the two other cells. This task is said to solicit 
on-tine cognitive processing (i.e. impressions that occurred at encoding). 
A perfect score for this task (i.e. 100%) would mean that participants correctly 
estimated that cell D contained four behaviours and that cell B contained eight. 
Any score above 100% represents an overestimation. With regard to frequency 
overestimation, an IC effect is analogous to a biased impression that exaggerates 
the proportion of items that were in the minority category. The frequencies shown 
in table 3.1 below indicate that patticipants made signiftcant overestimations for 
both cells D and B atT1 (154% & 152% respectively) ; 1(279) = 5.43 p < .0001 , t12 
= 8%, two-tailed, (SD0 = .544), and 1(279) = 4.54 p < .000 1, rf = 7%, two-tailed, 
(SD8 = .58). Participant's overestimation was even higher at T2 fo r cells D and B 
(159% & 155% respectively) 1(280) = 5.05 p < .000 1, 11.2 = 8% ,two-tailed, (SD0 = 
.49), t(280) = 6.25 p < .0001, 11.2 = I l%, two-tai led, (SD 8 = .54). As might be 
expected since results forD and B were similar, the di fferences between them at 
T 1 and at T2 are not significant. The indication wou ld be that participants 
generally overestimate the frequency ofbehaviour in the minority category 
regardless of the actor performing that behaviour. ln swnmary, Hl is not 
confirmed when using frequency estimations to measure IC since participants' 
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overestimations of minority behaviour, both in general and in specifie groups, 
occurred for both minority and majority actors. 
Table 3.1 
Mean Percentage Scores and Standard Deviations for Each Cell for Frequency 
Estimates and Attribution Hits. All Participants Combined 
CELLS 
Timel A B c D M 
Dependent %/SD %/SD %/SD %/SD Measure 
Freq est. 152/0.58 154/0.54 153 
Attr. hits 81/0.17 75/0.25 73/0.23 80/0.23 77.25 
Time2 
Freq est. 155/0.54 159/0.49 157 
Attr. hits 74/0.18 65/0.26 64/0.21 7110.27 68.5 
It should be noted that the attribution task, more so than the frequency 
estimation measure, is a faithful operationalization of the classical definition of 
illusory correlations. The attribution task requires participants to decide which 
ac tor performed each of the 36 behaviours that were presented in the original 
stimulus array. Whereas attribution hits representa participant's correct responses, 
i.e. attributing the given behaviour to the correct actor, since this is a forced choice 
task, participants' errors in attributing behaviour in a given cel! are by defmition 
misattributions toward the other actor. An re effect is shawn by greater 
misattributions or false alarms in cel! D since participants are making en·ors of 
commission by incorrectly associating the minority actor with salient minority 
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behaviour that was in fact originally displayed by the majority actor. In addition, 
unlike the frequency estimation task, the attribution task is considered to be 
schema-driven, (i.e. memory-based). Results for this re measure were quite 
different from those observed for frequency estimation. 
Overall mean attribution hit scores show a significant decrease from T 1 to T2 
(77% vs. 69%; t(280) = +8.463 p < .0001 , 112 = 20%, two-tailed) . Important for 
showing an re effect, participants' hit scores at Tl in cell B were significantly 
lower than in cel! D (75% vs. 80%), t(280) = -2.599 p = .01, 112 = 2%, two-tailed, 
meaning there were significantly more misattributions to cel! D than vice-versa. 
The same significant difference holds true at T2 where hits in cel! B are 6% lower 
than in cell D (65% vs. 71 %), t(280) = -2.783 p = .006, 112 = 2%, two-tailed. A 
significant difference in the opposite direction is seen at Tl and T2 when 
comparing cells C and A. The average attribution hit score is lower for cel! e, 
meaning there were significantly more misattributions to the majority actor at Tl, 
t(280) =+5.975, p < .0001, 112 = 11%, two-tailed, and at T2 t(280) = +6.910.p < 
.0001, 112 = 15%, two-tailed. The crucial result here is the significant inverse 
relationship for attribution hits when comparing cells B and D as opposed to 
comparing A ande, as seen in the two-way interaction between actor and 
behaviour (F(l, 284) = 46.898, p < .0001 112 = 14%). These results clearly confirrn 
the first hypothesis, i.e. there was an re effect when using individuals as targets, 
just as previous research had shawn for groups, and this effect occurs without 
giving participants any information asto the majority or minority status of the 
actors and without asking them to focus on one particular actor. 
Following Pouliot & eowen's (2000) findings, our second hypothesis (H2) 
predicted that re effects would occur when using either visual or verbal stimuli. 
However, given the greater vividness and concreteness of photographs compared 
to sentences, we expected that re effects would be somewhat diminished in this 
condition. Using the frequency estimation measure, we found a main effect fo r 
medium of presentation (F(l, 284) = 13.287,p < .0001 , 112 =4%). eombining data 
forT 1 and T2, frequency estimation for verbal groups was 163% whereas it was 
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149% for the visual groups . Participants made overestimations for both media, but 
overestimations of minority behaviour were signi.ficantly greater for verbal 
presentations. No interactions were found. between medium of presentation, actor 
and behaviour for this task. 
Results on the attribution task showed a significant main effect for medium of 
presentation (F(l , 284) = 71.580, p < .0001 , fl.2 = 20%). Overall , mean attribution 
hit scores i.n the verbal condition were lower (64%) than in the visual condition 
(76%). In fact, means for ali individual cells show better performance in the visual 
condition when compared to the verbal condition, meaning that misattributions 
were generally lower when the presentation was visual. Thus, a participant's 
attribution scores depend on the medium in which the information about target 
persons is presented . Once again, a two-way interaction between actor and 
behaviour occurs, which indicates an IC effect (as shown for Hl) . Furthermore, 
there is a significant three-way interaction (F(l , 284) = 7.403 ,p = .007, rt_2 =2%) 
because the degree of the two-way interaction depends on the medium. The two-
way interaction is much more pronounced in the verbal medium. These 
relationships can be seen in Figure 3.1 below. 
Further investigation (see Table 3.2 & 3.3) reveals that the media difference 
occurs pri.n1arily at Tl where the attribution hit means for verbal (66%) and visual 
(8 1 %) are signiftcantly different (F(l , 284) = 10.410, p = .001 , rt_2 = 3%). This 
diffe rence, although in the same direction, is no longer significant at T2 (ver. = 
62%, vis.= 71 %). 
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Figure 3.1 Three-way Interaction between Actor, Behaviour and Medium of 
Presentation for Attribution Hits 
There is a significant IC effect in both media combining data for TI and T2, as 
predicted. The strength of the visual medium, which produces generally higher 
attribution hit rates overall (i.e. !ess misattributions) seems to override the IC effect 
at T 1. After a week the effect of ti me overrides the strong effect of the visual 
medium and an IC effect does emerge, i.e. cel! D has more misattributions than 
cel! B white cellA has more than cel! C. Therefore, H2 is confi1med. Both media 
produce an IC effect overall, and this effect is stronger in the verbal condition than 
in the visual condition. 
Table 3.2 
Mean Percentages of Attribution Hits for Each Mediwn of Presentation 
Cel!: A B c D 
Tt Ver 1 Vis(%) 70 1 85 65 179 57 1 79 73 1 82 
T2 Ver 1 Vis(%) 67 1 77 36 1 51 55 1 67 68172 
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Table 3.3 
T-tests Comparing Proportion ofHits for Actors on Minority and Majority 
Behaviours for Each Medium and Time 
Comparison Tl T2 
Ver A vs C t (72) = 4.03 p < .0001, fl.2 = 8% t (72) = 3.47 p = .001, fl.2 = 5% 
Ver B vs D t (72) = -2.20 p = .031, fl.2 = 6% t (72) = -4.99 p < .000 1' 11.2 = 1% 
Vis A vs C t (207)= 4.50, p< .0001, fl.2 =9% t (207)= 6.03 p< .0001, 11.2 = 15% 
Vis B vs D t (207) = -1.65, p = .101 NS t (207)= -5 .33, p< .OOOl , fl.2 = 5% 
Our third hypothesis (H3) predicted that an IC effects should occur in both the 
real-world salience condition (RwS) where cell D contains negative behaviour and 
in the experimental salience condition (ExS) where cell D contains positive 
behaviour. However, given the greater potency and impact of negative (as opposed 
to positive) salient information in RwS, we expected the IC effect to be larger in 
that condition than in the ExS condition. 
For the frequency estimation measure, we found a main effect for salience type 
(F(l, 284) = 104.515, p < .000 1, fl.2 =27%) but in the direction opposite to our 
prediction. Mean frequency estimation scores combining Tl and T2 data in the 
RwS condition was 136% whereas it was 176% for the ExS condition. 
When loo king at mean attribution hit scores, we found a main effect for 
sali ence type (F(l, 284) = 28.617, p < .0001 , fl.2 = 9%). As predicted hit scores 
were lower in the ExS condition (66%) compared to the RwS condition (74%) 
which means that participants made significantly more misattributions in. the ExS 
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· condition. Further investigation reveals significant differences between salience 
types occur at bath Tl and T2. The difference between mean attribution hits for 
RwS (78%) and ExS (69%) at Tl is significant (F(l , 284) = 5.564, p = .019, 11.2 = 
2%), and sois the difference between RwS (70%) and ExS (64%) at T2 (F(l , 284) 
· = 8.866, p < .003, rf = 3%). 
Table 3.4 presents means at Tl and T2 for both types of salience. Paired 
sample !-tests compared cel! B vs . D and cel! A vs. C. Results indicate that there 
are no significant differences in the RwS condition, whereas bath cell pairs showed 
significant differences in the ExS condition at both test times (see Table 3.5 for 
these results). 
Table 3.4 
Mean Percentage Scores of Attribution Hits for Each Salience Type at Each Test 
Time 
Time Cel!: A B c D 
Tl RwS/ExS 77 1 84 85 1 68 74173 85 176 
T2 RwS/ExS 69 178 69 130 66163 73 / 70 
Table 3.5 
T-tests for Attribution Hits Comparing Cell Pairs in the ExS Condition 
Comparison Tl T2 
A vs C t ( 155)= 6.82, p< .OOO 1 re = 24%. t (155)= 7.45 . p< .OOOl rf = 27%. 
B vs D t (155) = -3 . 11 , p = .00211.2 = 5% t (155)= -8.71 p< .OOOl 11.2 = 34%. 
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Once again, considering the two-way interaction between actor and behaviour 
and the significant differences between cel! pairs in the ExS condition, we see that 
an re effect is present here but not in the RwS condition, contrary to the prediction 
in H3 that an re effect occurs for both conditions, as was found by Hamilton and 
Gifford (1976, experirnents 1&2) for group targets . rt would seem that when the 
targets are individuals, participants are only prone to the bias of an re effect when 
minority behaviour is positive. This effect was multiplied sevenfold at T2. In 
effect, it is possible that the ExS condition, being the [east cornmon in nature, is the 
one that stands out most. 
We also found a three-way interaction between salience type, actor and 
behaviour (F(l, 284) = 12.209,p= .001, rf =4%). Figure 3.2 presents attribution 
hits for RwS and ExS both times combined. Besides the main effect, we also found 
the inverse relationsrup when comparing the cell A and e pair to the cell B and D 
pair for each salience type. The general trend of a higher levet of attributions ruts 
for RwS seems constant except forcellA where a decrease in ruts can be observed 
from ExS to RwS. The three-way interaction confirms that the ExS condition 
significantly increases the re effect where misattributions are greater in cell D 
compared to B but inversely greater in A compared to e. 
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Figure 3.2 Three-way Interaction Between Actor, Behaviour and Salience 
Type for Attribution Hits. 
Our fourth hypothesis H4 predicted that the re e:ffect should be stronger with 
an impression formation task than with the memory task. The premise was that 
with an explicit impression task, salient (i.e. minority) information should have a 
greater impact when there is an explicit request to forman impression and the 
target is not previously known. This hypothesis was not confirmed in either the 
frequency estimation task or the attribution task since there was no significant 
difference between the two conditions. It appears that the two task set conditions 
did not really diffe r that rnuch from each other and that the distinct cognitive 
processing associated with each task was not so pure and simple, i.e. a bit of each 
process occurs in both cases. [n addition to what they are tnstructed to do, 
paLiicipants in the memory task are also forming an impression and participants in 
the impress ion task are also remembering the information that is presented. 
With regard to HS concerning an increase in re effects over time. Overall, each 
cel! shows increased attribution errors at T2 cornpared to Tl. However, the 
re lationship at both times is that the greater proportion of misattributions are 
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toward cel! D from cell B and toward cell A from cell e, which accounts for the re 
effect in both cases. The largest change is in cel! B (30%), which supports HS. The 
-changes ov"er time in bath media also support HS. Table 3.2 presents means at Tl 
and T2 for verbal and visual media. As can be seen, the re effect occurs for the 
verbal condition at bath Tl and T2, but it is much greater after a week's delay. 
Table 3.3 also presents the corresponding t-test results. In these tables, we can see 
that the largest difference between Tl and T2 occurs in cel! B, which translates 
into rnisattributions toward cel! D, and this occurs in both media. The finding of 
an re effect in the visual condition at T2 after no effect was seen at TL also 
supports HS. Another support for this hypothesis is seen in the ExS condition 
where the re effect at T2 is much greater than at Tl. lt would therefore seem that 
after a week, there is a general increase of an e:xisting re effect and even the 
.creation of an re effect that did not exist in the first place. 
Our sixth hypothesis H6 predicted that an interaction effect would occur 
between task set (impression vs. memory) and salience type RwS (when negative 
behaviour is salient) vs. ExS (when positive behaviour is salient). We bad 
predicted that the combined effects of salient negative behaviour and an impression 
task would produce yet greater re effects than either condition alone and certainly 
.more than the opposite combination of salient positive behaviour and a memory 
task. As was found for the main e:ffect for task, there were no higher order 
interactions with this variable and therefore the re is no support for either H6 or H7, 
which predicted a three-way interaction between task, salience type and time of 
testing. 
Hypotheses that relate to recall and recognition measures 
. Recall and recognition measures are the staples of memory research. However, 
they are not usually foLmd in re research. As previously stated, we included these 
measures because they truly complement re research and contribute to a more 
thorough understanding of the phenomenon. As we can see in table 3.6, recall hils, 
which represent the number of correct res panses freely recalted by participants . A 
hit on this measure means that behaviour and actor were correct! y identified. 
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Recall err or is a measure of false alarms. It combines the wrong answers (i.e. 
misidentifying the actor) with the ones that were invented. For recognition, 
participants had to determine for each of 32 actor- behaviour cornbinations (four 
from each cel! and four foils for each cel!), whether they had seen or read the 
information in the original presentation. Before looking at the data for the last four 
hypotheses concerning memory effects associated with different independent 
variables, we will look at the overall results as presented in Table 3.6 below. 
Table 3.6 
Mean Percentage Scores and Standard Deviations for Each Cell for Each 
Dependent Memory Measure Combining All Participants 
Timel 
Dependent 
Measure 
Recall hits 
Recall Errors 
Recog hits 
Recog FA 
Time2 
Recall hits 
Recall Errors 
Recog hits 
Recog FA 
A 
% / SD 
35/0.16 
4.6/0.08 
87/0.07 
14/0.67 
26/0.16 
5.1/0.09 
81/1.10 
35/1.11 
CELLS 
B c D 
%/SD %/SD % / SD 
33/0.20 38/0.21 42/0.25 
6.3/0.12 7.5/0.13 7.0/0.17 
87/0.96 74/1.18 85/0.94 
14/0.84 12/1.04 16/0.89 
24/0.19 29/0.20 35/0.25 
7.3/0.14 8.5/0.12 11.5/0.25 
84/1.13 72/1.12 78/ 1.17 
3111.23 3311.29 35/ 1.18 
M 
37 
6.3 
83 
14 
28 
8.1 
78 
34 
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Des pite ali experimental controls, T2 is not 100% identical to T 1 when 
comparing recall or recognition rates. The context of memory testing at T 1 and T2 
are different (aside from the delay of one week) in that at T2 participants had 
additional familiarization with the 36 stimuli because the attribution task at Tl 
occurs after they had responded to the recall and recognition tasks at T 1. This 
· additional exposure to the 36 stimuli before T2 testing could make recall and 
recognition scores at T2 better than they would have been otherwise. In that sense, 
ifthere are significant differences between memory at Tl and T2, they would tend 
to be an underestimate of the effect of the passage of ti me and finding significant 
differences would be more di:fficult. 
Using McNemar's test, as can be seen in Table 3.6, there is a nine percent 
reduction in recall hits from Tl (37%) to T2 (28%). This difference is significant 
t(279) = +9.13. p < .000 1, '1.2 = 23%, two-tailed (SDT1 = .16; SDT2 = .15). 
Loo king at the individual cells for this task, we can see that at T 1, participants 
were better at recalling behaviour for cell D than for cel! B (42% vs. 35% 
respectively). This difference is significant, t(279) = -5 .65.p < .0001 , '1.2 = 6%, 
two-tailed; (SD0 = .25; SD8 = .20). This difference is also signi:ficant at T2 where 
recall for cell D is 35% whereas it is 24% for cel! B, t(279) = -7.04. p <.000 1, rf= 
15%, two-tailed (SD0 = .25; SD2 = .19). The three percent difference between 
cells C and A (38% vs. 35%, respectively) at Tl is also significant, t(279) = -2.88 p 
= .01 , '1.2 = 3%, two-tailed, (SDc = .21; SDA = .16). Likewise, this difference at T2 
was also found to be significant, t(279) = -2.39 p = .02, '1.2 = l %, two-tailed (SDc = 
.20; SDA = .16). The percentage ofrecall hits for cell Dis the highest of the four 
cel ls at both times. Thus, recall for the combination minority actor, minority 
behaviour was propo1iionally greater than for any other cel!. However, since the 
results for both cel! pairs (D vs. B & C vs. A) show significant differences in the 
same direction the data on recall does not follow the pattern that is normally seen 
when there is an IC effect. This raises the question as to the role of memory in 
producing the effect. 
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Mean recall errors significantly increased over time, t(279) = -2.55 p = .0 11 , rf 
= 2%, two-tailed . At Tl, recall error was 6.32% (SD11 =.59) whereas it was 
8.10% at T2 (SDT2 = .06). The small difference in percentage recall error between 
cell D and cell B at Tl (6.93 %vs. 6.25% resp.) was not significant but the 
difference between these cells at T2 was significant (1 1.50% vs. 7.30% 
respective! y), t(279) = -3.51. p = .00 1, rf= 5%, two-tailed, (SDo = .25; SD8 = .14). 
The difference in recall error at Tl for cell C vs. A (7.53% vs. 4.56% resp.) was 
significant t(279) = -4.34 p < .0001, rf = 5%, two-tailed (SDc = .13; SDA = .08). 
The difference at T2 for cell C vs. A (8.54% vs . 5.09% resp.) was still significant, 
t(279) = -5.47 p < .0001, 112 = 10%, two-tailed (SDc = .12; SDA = .09). Therefore, 
errors for the minority actor were always greater regardless of the type of 
behaviour, which does not follow the pattern seen when there is an IC effect. 
General results presented in Table 3.6 show that recognition hits significantly 
decrease by 5% from T 1 to T2 (83% vs. 78%); t(255) =+3.274. p = .00 1, 112 = 3%, 
two-tailed (SD11 = 0.713; SD12 = 0.769). There is no significant difference 
between ce lls Band D at Tl for this measure (87% vs. 85% respectively), but at T2 
cell B (84%) is significantly higher than cell D (78%), t(280) = +3.289 p = .001 , 
112 = 3%, two-tailed , (SD0 = !.17; SD8 = L 134). 1-Iowever, there is also a 
significant difference in the same direction between recognition in cellA (87%) 
and cell C (74%) at Tl t(279) = +7.277 p < .0001, 112 = 15%, two-tailed, (SDc = 
1.175 ; SDA = !.070) and at T2 where recognition in cellA (81 %) was again greater 
than in cell C (72%), t(279) = +4.246 p < .0001, 112 = 5%, two-tailed, (SDc = 
1.116; SDA = 1.095). In general, recognition was better for the majority actor 
regardless of behaviour. Therefore, at neither Tl nor T2 do we see the pattern that 
normally appears when there is an IC effect. 
False alarms rates on the recognition task show an overall significant 20% 
increase from Tl to T2 (SD1 1 = 0.51 ; SDn= 0.88), t(29l) = +14.435.p < .0001 , 
112 = 40%, two-tailed. There are no significant differences at Tl between cells D 
and 8 (16% vs. 14% resp.), but there is at T2 (35% vs. 31% resp.) , t(279) = +2 .19 
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p = .029, rf = l %, two-tailed (SD0 = 1 .18; SD8 = 1.23). In contrast, the two 
percent difference for cel! C and A at Tl and at T2 were not significant. 
Our eighth hypothesis H8 predicted that participants would be better at 
· detecting false alarms in the visual condition for both recall and recognition. 
Differences between T 1 and T2 for verbal and vi sua! presentations were significant 
in cell B, C and D (B: X2 = 5.634 (1 ,208) p = .0 18, rf = 3%), (C: X2 = 9.446 (1,208) 
p =.002, 112 = 5%), (D : X2 = 9.121 (1,208) p =.003 , 112 = 5%). In general, there was 
. a significantly lower false alarm rate in the visua[ condition compared to the verbal 
condition. We found no significant differences between the usua[ cell pairs (A vs. 
C & B vs. D) in the verbal medium at either Tl or T2. In the visual condition, 
where false alarm rates were lowest, there was a significantly higher false a larm 
rate in cell B compared to cel! D at Tl (x2 = 6.22 (1 , 208), p = .013, 112 = 3%), as 
weil as at T2 (X2 = 5.634 (1,208) p = .018, 112 = 3%). No such differences were 
found between cells A and C. A main effect was found for behaviour in the visual 
condition (MajB = .47 MinB = .36, Z = 2. 10, p = .036, 112 =2 %). Essentially, this 
is almost the opposite of the pattern that is seen when the re is an IC effect. 
Further analyses reveal that significant time differences occurred in the 
verbal condition. All four cells show a difference fro m T 1 to T2: (A: X2 = 6.88 
(1,81) p = .009 112 = 9%; B: X2 = 6.32 (1,81) p = .o 12 112 = 7%; c: X2 = 4.23 (1,81) p 
=.04011.2 =5% andD:x2 =2 1.79(1 ,8l)p < .OOOl ll.2 = 27%). Thegreater 
difference is for cell D. These effects were not found in the vis ua[ condition, with 
cell D showing the greatest difference. It would also appear that the false alarm 
rate increases for cell D with visual media whereas they decrease in the verbal 
media. 
As presented in table 3.7 participants consistently made fewer errors for cell D 
than for any other ce l! and this for both media. Interesting to note that en·ors from 
Tl to T2 in cel! D almost doubled in the visual condition. 
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Table 3.7 
Mean Proportions for Recall Errors by Medium ofPresentation 
Media CELL 
Ti me A B e D 
Tl Ver 1 Vis 62130 52123 63129 40 1 13 
T2 Ver 1 Vis 62137 55 133 49143 48 125 
Table 3.8 presents the means for recognition error by medium of presentation at 
Tl and T2. As we can observe, false alarrn scores in the verbal condition go down 
from cells A to e and from B to D at both times. We found two significant 
differences : eell B (3.5%) vs. D (1.1%) at Tl , ('t = 9.82 (1,81)p = .002 !12 = 
12%), which suggests an re effect for Tl. The other significant effect was for cell 
A (6.5%) vs. e (4 .6%) at T2, (X2 = 9.76 (1,81) p = .002, !12 = 12%). As for the 
visual condition, means go down from cells A to e at both times but the false 
alarm rate increases from cell B to D, suggesting an interaction effect. Results 
indicate that the difference between cells A and e at Tl differed significantly: X2 = 
8.43 (1 ,21 L) p = .004, 11.2 = 33%). Renee, in the verbal condition we see an re 
effect at T 1, but not at T2. No re effects are detected in the visual condition. 
Table 3.8 
Means Propotiions for Recognition Errors (FA) by Medium of Presentation 
Media eell 
Ti me A B c D 
Tl Ver 1 Vis 43147 35/38 28134 L l 145 
T2 Ver 1 Vis 65140 53 139 46 139 52 146 
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The ninth hypothesis H9 concerned differences in memory due to the type of 
salience. Table 3.9 presents mean percentage recall scores for each cell in both 
salience conditions. At-test reveals that the only significant difference exists 
between cells A (44%) and C (48%) for the RwS condition at T2 (t(124) = -2.115 p 
= .036, rf = 3%). The higher recall hit rate in cell D compared to B is not 
sigrùficant. As for the ExS condition, cells B and D are significantly different from 
each other at both times. Tl (t(l55) = -3.48l,p = .00111.2 = 7%), T2 (t(155) = -
5.193,p < .0001, fl.2 = 5%), whereas cells A and C are not different from each 
other at Tl and T2. 
Table 3.9 
Mean Percentage of Recall Hits for Bach Salience Type at Each Test Time 
Salience Cel! 
Ti me A B c D 
Tl RwS/ ExS 53 162 59 151 56160 62159 
T2 RwS /ExS 44 15 1 53 135 48 148 48 142 
Hence, it would appear that just as the ExS condition seemed more favourable 
than RwS in creating an IC effect, the memory data on recall hits generally repeats 
that pattern, which might suggest that memory pla ys a raie in IC. However, if we 
look more closely at the data we see first that the pattern of D >B and C >A for 
recall only corresponds to the ExS condition. In RwS, the pattern was like this for 
attribution hits, but now with recall it is not like that at ail. Secondly, recall is 
generally a little better for RwS, especially for cel! D which has a mean of 55 in 
RwS but only 50.5 in ExS. Although the difference in recall is sigrùficant when 
comparing D vs. 8 in ExS, the best recall is always in cells A and C for either 
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condition. Therefore, the significant difference between D and B is really due to 
· the poor recall in cell B for ExS at both Tl and T2. 
We found a three-way interaction (fig. 3.3) between salience type, actor and 
behaviour F(l, 273) = 21.866,p < .0001, 11.2 =7%). Tlùs occurs because there is a 
two-way interaction between behaviour and actor in the ExS condition but not in 
the RwS condition. Therefore, only the ExS condition has a pattern ofrecall that 
resembles the pattern found when there is an re effect, i.e. the inverse relationship 
between cell pairs: recall is greater in cel! A than cell C, but greater in cell D 
compared to cel! B. It seems that the special properties of cell D depend on the 
qualitative nature of the salience. The atypical salience in the ExS condition 
promotes memory for stimuli in cell D (the good behaviour performed by a 
general! y bad persan), but this does not occur when the minority behaviour is what 
is normally found in the real world, i.e. that bad behaviour is sometimes found 
among otherwise good people. 
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Figure 3.3 Three-Way Interaction Between Actor, Behaviour and Salience 
Type for Recall Hits. 
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The· ninth hypothesis also predicted that there would be higher recognition rates 
in cell D (especially compared to cel! B) in the real world salience condition (RwS) 
compared to the experimental salience condition (ExS). As seen in Table 3.10 
results show that in bath salience conditions, the proportion of participants with 
high recognition scores in cell D is lower compared to cell B. In addition, this is 
much more pronounced in the RwS condition where the difference is signi:ficant 
for bath times (T 1: X2 = 7.52 (1, 129) p = .006, 112 = 6%; T2: X2 = 9.49 (1, 129) p = 
.002, 112 = 8%). This does not follow the prediction. There were also significant 
differences in the ExS condition but only for cells A vs. C, (Tl: X2 = 58.06 (l, 163) 
p < .0001 , re = 36%; T2: X2 = 48.08 (1 ,163) p < .0001112 = 29%). At the same 
time, there is no inverse relation in either condition when cell C is compared to A 
at bath Tl and T2. Therefore, overall this recognition pattern does not correspond 
to what is seen when the re is an I C effect. 
In addition, recogn ition scores for cel! A and B are highest in bath conditions at 
bath times showing that participants are better at recognizing majority behaviour 
regardless of the ac tor. These findings do not support the prediction of a higher 
recognition rate in cell D. The proportion of participants who have higher 
recognition scores is signi:ficant1y greater in the ExS condition for all cells except 
cellA when compared to the RwS condition. This does not support H9 . 
. Table 3.10 
Mean Percentage for Recognition Hits by Salience Type by Time 
Salience Cell 
Time A B c D 
Tl RwS / ExS 75 /7 1 75 / 56 63 / 28 60 / 50 
T2 RwS / ExS 51 / 56 66/48 50 / 20 48 / 44 
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False alarms (table 3.11) were predicted to show the same pattern as 
recognition hits. The proportion of participants scoring above the expected median 
in cel! D is generally higher than the proportion in cel! B in the RwS condition 
while the reverse relation holds when comparing cel! C to A in this condition. This 
is the typical IC pattern ofhigher false alarm rates for cell D at Tl and T2 while 
the opposite relation holds for cell C vs. A. This does not occur in the ExS 
condition where false alarm rates are al ways higher for the majority actor. In this 
sense, H9 is confirmed when looking at false alarm data. With regard to cell D 
alone, the ExS condition has a significantly higher proportion of participants with 
higher rates offalse alarms compared to the RwS condition at Tl (Z = -5 . 11 p < 
.000, rf = 9%). This is contrary to the prediction that RwS would produce a higher 
rate of errors in cell D and even though this difference no longer appears at T2, the 
hypothesis is not confirmed. 
Table 3.11 
Mean Proportions for Recognition Error (False Alarms) by Salience Type by T ime 
Salience Cel! 
Time A B c D 
Tl RwS /ExS 47 146 14 1 56 36 129 20 1 47 
T2 RwS 1 ExS 45149 26 1 57 44 1 39 42 1 52 
Ow- tenth hypotheses HlO predicted that recall would be better in the 
impression task than it would be for the memory task. As found earlier when 
examining IC effects, we did not find any significant differences between 
impression and memory with regard to recall hits. This hypothesis also pred icted 
that recall error rates (i.e. false alarms) would be greater in cel! D, which i exactly 
what was found . Recall errors represent incorrect identification of the actor 
performing the behaviow-, which is analogous to a misattribution. 
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Our eleventh hypothesis H 11 stipulated that the decrease in recall would be 
greater than the decrease in recognition. Looking back at Table 3.6, we can see that 
means for recall decrease from Tl (37%) to T2 (28%). This is a proportional 
decrease of24.3%. As we have previously seen, this nine percent drop is 
significant. Ther~ is also a significant five percent decrease in recognition between 
Tl (83%) and T2 (78%), 1(255) =+3.27.p = .001, f12 = 3%, two-tailed (SDT1 = 
0.71; SDT2 = 0.77). The proportional decrease in this case, however is only 6%. 
The 4% difference between the decrease in recall and decrease in recognition is in 
the predicted direction, but the difference is not significant. However, when 
considering that recognition hits was significantly higher than recall hits at both T 1 
· and T2, it is more important to consider the relative decreases, which were clearly 
greater for recall. The overall data show that recall was rouch harder than 
recognition. We also expected these differences over time to be greater for non-
salient stimuli (i.e. cells A, B, and C), which was not the case. The hypothesis also 
predicted that cell D hit rates would be proportionally higher at T2 when compared 
with T 1. Recall and recognition sco res do not reflect that prediction. Finally, we 
also predicted that false alarm rates would be higher at T2, which is exactly what 
we found. False alarm rates for cell D at T2 (35%) are almost doubled , compared 
to false alarm rates at Tl ( 16%). This represents an increase of 118% and the 
difference is significant (Z = 5.39 , p =, 0001, f12 = 10%). Likewise, as mentioned 
earlier, overall misattributions toward cell D were higher at T2 (31%) than at Tl 
(23%), however the same was true for misattributions to cell B although at a lower 
rate (T2 = 29%, Tl= 20%) . 
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DISCUSSION 
Our fu:st objective aimed at extending the IC effect to individual targets. This is 
supported. Overall, we find a clear IC effect for the attribution measure (looking at 
misattributions toward cell D). There is also a clear overestimation of cell D 
behaviour, but we also found this overestimation for cell B, which indicates that 
cell Dis not unique in this respect. The nature of the task is such that we only get 
data on minority behaviours for each actor. Having no measure for the majority 
behaviow- do es not permit us to determine the extent of biased perceptions for that 
category, i.e. exaggerated estimates regarding the majority categories for both 
ac tors. 
There is a big difference between the nature of the frequency estimation task 
and the attribution task even though both aim at measuring the same effect. In fact 
the frequency estimation task, which may be a reasonable sociological question 
when the target is a group of people (how many members of this group show 
bad/good behaviour?), is a little odd when referring to individuals because we 
don ' t normal! y think of people in terms of the proportion of the ir behaviours that 
are good or bad. Furthermore, the frequency estimate is a global measure and not 
necessarily based on memory at ali, just as global impressions do not necessarily 
coïncide with the recall of the behaviours or traits upon which the impression is 
based (Srull & Wyer, 1980). 
Therefore, our present findings do extend what was previously found for 
groups and inanimate abjects when using the classic re paradigm developed by 
Hamilton and Giffard (1976), except for the fact that there are also overestimations 
of minority behaviour for majority actor ( cell B). Again, this suggests that a 
difference exists between the perception of individuals and groups and categories 
DBIC and social stimuli 
of abjects. The latter are more arbitrary and the links between individual stimuli 
(group members or abjects) are not perceived to be causally connected in the way 
that an individual's behaviours are connected. People assume that an individual ' s 
actions are tied together by his personality traits. However, there is no similar 
notion to explain the behaviours that have nothing to do with group membership 
even though the individuals ail belong to the same gro up. In addition, impression 
formation is naturally triggered by perceiving another person, whereas an 
analogous evaluative process may not occur when receiving information about 
various individuals or abjects that are identified as members of an anonymous 
abstract group. Therefore, participants ' are likely forrning impressions of both 
targets in all conditions. This may account for our lack of significant findings 
between the impression and memory task set. 
When participants judge the larger majority group as in Hamilton and Gifford's 
(1976) research, or the larger group of abjects as in Pouliot and Cowen's (2000) 
research, these co llections of diverse persans or abjects would not have much 
cohesion. In contrast, no matter how many behaviours of an individual one might 
observe, whether that nwnber is relatively large or small, i.e. majority or minority, 
the perceiver assumes they are connected when they depict the sarne individual 
target. Therefore, the same bias seen in global judgments or overestimations 
occurs for both targets. However, when using the more precise attribution task, 
which is a cued recall task that involves 36 responses, there is a much better chance 
of detecting differences between errors in cells B and D and of comparing that to 
en·ors in A and C. By its very nature, the attribution task is more comprehensive 
and more sensitive than the frequency estimation task and it directly calls up 
memory processes whereas the frequency estimation task does not. With this more 
precise task, our first objective is upheld . 
Our second objective was to better determine the role of memory in producing 
the IC effect. When we look at free recall data, we see that it is al ways better for 
the minority actor regardless of whether the behaviour was more or Jess frequently 
observed (maj. Beh. Vs. min Beh.). Even though recall was indeed best for cell D 
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(vs. B), the fact that it is also higher for cell e (vs. A) in our control cornparison 
do es not support the idea that the I e effect is based on better recall of the most 
salient information in the array (i.e. cell D). A sirnilar pattern was foLmd for recall 
errors, i.e. errors of commission, in which cell D again was not unique because cell 
e also had greater errors than cell A at both Tl and T2. Once more, it is not the 
doubly salient properties of cell D that seem to account for the re findings. 
However, the salience of the minority actor, of which half as many behaviours are 
· preserited, does possibly play a role in producing the greater rate of hits in cell D 
· and errors of commission in cell C. 
Results for recognition hits present the reverse relationship. The majority 
actor has the highest rate ofhits. However, when looking at false alarms, which 
are directly measured by this task, we can see a pattern that resembles an re effect 
at both T 1 and T2, since errors are grea ter for cell D than for cell B . In contrast, 
there is no significant difference between cells e and A at Tl and at T2 cellA has 
more errors than cell e. Thus, only false alarm rates show the pattern that would be 
expected for cell D if it were in fact unique. On the other hand, the attribution data 
clearly shows a significant bias toward cell D in particular. eonsequ ently, the onJy 
time there was a significant result for memory was when using false alarm data, 
which is the memory measure that most closely resembles the misattributions seen 
in the attribution task. In conclusion, misidentification (false alarms on the 
recognition test) and misattributions ( errors on the attribution task) are the 
measures that most clearly validate something about the role of memory and the Ie 
effect. rronically, it is not the presence of better memory due to salience; it is false 
memories that make cell D unique. At the same time, recognition hit rates are 
higher for the majority actor regardless of the behaviour category, as was found by 
Pouliot & eowen (2000). 
As we have seen, the reverse pattern occurs for recall hits, which is closer to 
what we expected. However, given that salience does not seem to play a role with 
other memory measures, what we found may not be due entirely to the salience of 
the minority actor but may in pati be because recall is a more difficult task. 
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Because of the dif:ficulty, there would be a greater impact on memory for the 
majority actor since there are twice as many items to be retained. Participants may 
have a limit to the number of paired associations (actor and behaviour) that they 
can retain and b~cause the number of paired stimuli is doubled for the majority 
actor, it may render the recall task much more challenging for his behaviour. 
Although previous IC research found no effect of cognitive load on recognition, a 
recall task has never been used in the past and so the influence of cognitive load on 
recall has never been previously detennined. It is likely that because the recall task 
is more challenging, a given leve! of cognitive load (i.e. the rate of presenting the 
36 stimuli) has a negative impact on recall whereas it does not affect recognition 
performance. Not only is recognition an easier cognitive task in general, in our 
particular test there were an equal number of items representing each cell and each 
actor. Therefore, the easier task combined with equivalent representations from 
each cell may have also contributed to a reduction of the impact of salience on 
responses. There is also the possibility that it was easier to correctly identify the 
hits for the majority actor by guessing since it is more likely that a schema for cell 
A (orB) would have developed due to receiving twice as much infonnation about 
the majority actor in the initial stimulus arTay (as was explained by Pouliot & 
Cowen, 2000). 
Our third objective was to determine iftime had an effect on illusory 
correlations. Our findings show that the IC effect grew stronger with time. The 
increase was seen overall and in specifie conditions. We even found that an IC 
effect could occur at T2 when none was measured at Tl , in particular for the visual 
medium and for false alarms in general. If IC effects were linked to false alarms 
and misattributions in cell D, it would suggest that false memories could increase 
over time due to the bias triggered by the IC effect. Even the less sensitive measure 
of frequency estimation showed an increased bias toward overestimation at T2 
compared to Tl , although this was true for both actors, not just the minority. 
Research on memory demonstrates that performance is reduced with the passage of 
time. In conjunction with this generai rule, our research demonstrates that a 
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reduction in performance can be linked to augmentation and even creation of the 
re phenomenon. These results would suggest that res are linked to mak.ing errors 
orto forgetting rather than to better retention of salient information. 
Our fourth objective was to determine if media would have an effect on illusory 
· correlations. As expected, the presentation ofvisual stimuli significantly improves 
memory performance compared with presentation of verbal stimuli. Hit rates are 
higher and error rates are lower in visual groups. Nonetheless, the combined data 
for Tl and T2 shows an re effect for both media, but as stated earlier this really 
only emerges at T2 for the visual medium. However, the effect is stronger for 
verbal presentations as seen in the significant three-way interaction between 
medium, actor and behaviow·. As stated in the results section, the strength of the 
visual medium, which produces significantly higher attribution hit rates overall 
(i.e. less misattributions) seems to override the re effect at TL, but after a week, the 
effect oftime ov~rrides the strong effect of the visual medium and an re effect 
does emerge. 
The fifth objective was to determine what role salience (RwS, ExS) plays in re 
effects. It is interesting that we found an re effect for ExS but not RwS. It might 
have to do with the expectations that one may have about individuals, as opposed 
to groups or inanimate objects. The ExS condition possibly he lped characterize the 
actor as a generally negative person. This would make him distinct in a society 
where people are generally good. Therefore, participants would not only be 
influenced by the salience of a negative person, they would also be influenced by 
the salience of positive behaviour due to its infrequency. This effect was seen by 
Pouliot & Cowen (2000) in their memory test, where errors tended to be biased 
toward the more·frequent category. Thus, the effects of cell A could combine with 
those of cell D to produce larger illusory correlation. This effect would not be 
prominent when making frequency estimations. Following this line of thought, the 
IC effect in the ExS condition may be due in part to the combined influence of 
negative valence and high frequency in cel! A, not just to sa lience of items in cel! 
D. 
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Based on our fmdings, we can assert that salience hasan effect on !Cs, but the 
manipulation by which the valence of salient information is reversed needs more 
attention in research since this study is the first after Hamilton and Giffard (1976, 
exp. 2) to attempt a replication with a similar paradigm. Otherwise, a possible 
explanation for the fact that we did not find the IC effect for RwS lies in the fact 
that even though we found general trends for higher cell D hit rates in attribution, 
recognition, recall errors and false alarm rneasures, these trends did not make it to 
the significant leve!. However, RwS did show a significant effect in the recall and 
in the recognition hit measures. All in ali, this cornbination of results for R wS 
does offer sorne support to the notion that salience plays a role. However, the fact 
that ExS produces significantly more of an effect suggests again that the striking 
quality of a fundamentally bad persan is not equivalent to a group in which the 
majority of a random selection of rnembers behaves badly as individuals outside 
the group, especially for an anonymous group that has no defming characteristics 
ofits own. 
Our sixth objective aimed at determining if task set (Imp vs. Mem) would 
influence illusory correlations. Our impression and memory task were designed to 
create different cognitive orientations, which would in turn influence the way 
information would be processed. Following McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton 
( 1994), the impress ion task was designed to promote on-tine processing whereas 
the memory task was designed to promote memory-based processing. As 
previously mentioned Sanbonn1atsu, Sherman and Hamilton, (1987) had 
hypothesized that on-line processing was responsible for them not finding the IC 
effect for individual targets. At the same time, Pouliot and Cowen (2000) 
suggested that the lC effect might not have been memory-based. 
There were no s ignificant differences between impression formation and 
memory tasks. onetheless, we must consider that participants were given the 
impression or memory consolidation tasks (white the 36 stimuli were presented) as 
a preamble to the other tasks ( i.e. the dependent measures) and that IC effects were 
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indeed found in the attribution task, wh_ich is considered a memory-based task. but 
not for frequency estimation, which is more of an impression task. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both impression and memory 
processes are activated simultaneously when processing information about 
· individuals and that these processes are not mutually exclusive. In the current 
study, using the classic re paradigm, the orientation task (during consolidation) 
was not sufficient to override the influence of the other type of processing. It is 
also possible that because participants must process information about two target 
ind1viduals, they form impressions regardless of the consolidation task, because 
they are not only judging each piece of data as received, they also must compare 
and distinguish between the two actors as they receive more and more stimuli (and 
as already mentioned, the task of memorization may be particularly challenging). 
At the same time, to the extent that frequency estimation is the result of an on-line 
process of global impression fonnation, it does not appear that this process is more 
prominent for one actor as opposed to the other since overestimations linked to 
inconsistent salient information occur in both cases. 
Altematively, we could propose that res may not even be related to cognitive 
m~chanisms (instrument, machine, method) but are instead related to a cognitive 
. structure (arrangement, organisation, and configuration). As such, the re 
phenomenon could be a form of schema truough which information (data) is 
processed. Its structure would not depend on any particular mechanism . Rather, it 
could be a filter through wruch information passes on its way to being encoded or 
retfieved. Defming the re phenomenon as a structure could return to a 
connectionist fra.mework for person memory where nades are influenced by the 
neighbo uring ones. The re effect wou ld occw· by biasing or weighi.ng information 
as it passes through the different nades. This idea has featt.tres in common with the 
!me ofthought developed by McConnell, Sherman and Hamilton (1994). They 
suggested that a post-encoding process could be involved in the formation of 
illusory correlations. That is , classification or j udgments about target stimuli 
change because of other target stimuli that are subsequently introduced, to which 
91 
DBIC and social stimuli 
we would add that each additional stimulus would also be filtered, i.e. weighed or 
biased by connected information already in memory. Our findings in the attribution 
task seem to corroborate these two theories since time was shown to have an e:ffect 
on the IC phenomenon. In essence, finding a stronger effect at T2, compared to Tl , 
or fmding an e:ffect at T2 when none existed at Tl, demonstrates that information 
does not remain static in memory. As such, we could consider that prior 
information influences the encoding of new information and that new information 
influences the re-coding of older information. 
Other considerations 
Our attribution and frequency estimation tasks aimed to solicit different 
cognitive mechanisms. As such, the ath·ibution task is similar to cued recall where 
specifie data is used to prompt memory. On the other hand, the frequency 
estimation task is considered to solicit a global approach to judgment (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1973) 
Düs global approach to judgment of information may explain the results we 
found for the frequency estimation task. Participants may have overestimated both 
cell B and cell D behaviour by first responding to the ease with which it cornes to 
mind due to the quantity of stimuli presented in cell B, and second, by responding 
to the saliency of cell D behaviour. It is not impossible that sheer quantity of 
majority behav iour and salience of minority behaviour may have thus acted 
simultaneous ly in this task. Furthermore, salience and incongruity (Schmidt, 1991) 
of ExS behaviour may have had participants overestimate, to an even larger degree, 
both frequencies in that condition. The current results suggest there are indeed 
different cognitive functions associated with the two re tasks although both present 
similarities since neither promotes extensive search in memory. There is a 
somewhat analogous difference between the effects of verbal and visual media, in 
that the two media are also said to solicit different cognitive mechanisms (Paivio, 
1971 , in S. Fiske & S. Taylor, 1991). The present study confirmed the superiority 
of visual over verbal. 
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Limitations and future research 
One possible_ limitation of the current study is related to the procedures 
necessary for having adequate contrais during the testing phase so that dependent 
measures in ail conditions could be directly compared, even though halfthe 
participants read the info about the targets while the other half saw the info about 
the targets. In addition, it was considered more realistic to ask verbal questions 
about what was seen since in daily life one is rarely asked if a photo or picture · 
represents something one has witnessed in the past. Nevertheless, in eyewitness 
testimony, the use of "mug shots", sw-veillance videos or line-ups are typical 
testing procedures that tap visual memory (although they can obviously also solicit 
false visual memories or biases such as ICs). On the other hand, we must not 
· forget that even in eyewitness testimony, the probability of having actual pictures 
of a persan engaged in good or bad behaviow- is not very likely. 
In the visual condition of the present study, participants were given 
questionnaires that used words to describe the pictures. In essence, they were asked 
to convert visual stimuli into semantic equivalents; a step that patticipants in the 
verbal condition did not have to go through. Future research using the visual 
condition could use questionnaires that included small photographs instead of 
words on the attribution and recognition tests . This could possibly eliminate the 
cognitive step needed to convert visual information into semantic information and 
allow researchers to see to what extent the process of h·anslation influences results 
in visual groups. Considering that in the present study the visual condition 
produced a significantly weaker IC ef fect, if this translation between mental 
representations has any effect it would appear to be one of attenuation ofiC 
effects. Perhaps the influence of the filter or of post encoding, is reduced by the 
need togo from visual to verbal . It would be interesting to see ifthe IC e:ffect is 
stronger or yet further reduced when no translation to a verbal representation is 
necessary. This procedure only applies to the attribution and recognition tasks 
since neither verbal nor visual information depicting or describing the original 36 
stimuli are presented in free recall or frequency estimation tasks. 
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Using visual test material could be accomplished if each studentlparticipant is 
equipped with a computer and where a program could replace the hard copy of the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, this method of testing would mak:e additional data 
available to the researcher. Particularly, this could permit gathering data on 
response times that is known to be a sensitive measure and that might detect subtle 
differences in our eight conditions. Computer data could also make it easier to 
determine if there are primacy or recency effects and compare recall of common 
vs. uncommon behaviours, etc. 
A possibility for the results found for impression and memory lies in the 
manner in which the variable was operationalized. We had participants either write 
down key words for the memory condition, or write down the valence (pos-neg) of 
the behaviour being presented for the impression condition. In retrospect, it is 
impossible for us to surmise that participants in the impression formation condition 
did not commit specifie information to memory. Likewise, participants in the 
memory condition could have formed impressions of the stimuli being presented. 
Therefore, the intended specificity of each task may not have followed through in 
the actual processing of the stimuli. As a post-script, we may have had more 
success in differentiating impression and memory by using a comprehension task 
(see McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton, 1994) 
Our experimental manipulation for creating an impression and a memory 
co ndi tion seems insufficient for its intent. On the attribution task, which is a kind 
of memory task rather than an impression task, participants are implicitly pushed to 
search for the answer in memory. Of course, if they do not find the answer after 
searching memory, they can guess an answer based on their "global" impression. 
However, the attribution task in a sense can override the orientation given by the 
impress ion consolidation task. This would make the two task set groups perform 
similarly because l) both processes can occur in both conditions and 2) the 
attribution task directs them to search memory regardless of how the consolidation 
task oriented them during reception of info. 
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Similarly, although the memory task set orients participants to memorize rather 
than forman impression along the way, the natural process that is induced when 
seeing/reading information about another person is to forman impression. 
Impression formation is a fundamentall y adaptive and efficient process needed to 
determine if other people are :friend or foe, good or bad, i.e. it is a basic process 
necessary for survival in the social world . Memorizing specifie behaviours is not 
an automatic or necessarily adaptive or efficient process. In addition, people 
typically do not attempt to retrieve specifie data on another person to determine 
how to respond to or judge that other perso n. Therefore, the frequency estimation 
task may invite people to recall what they specifically saw or read, but as we have 
seen, recall is much harder than cued recall or recognition. Furthermore, the 
frequency estimation task would require an extremely difficult memory task if 
memory was at aU involved. Participants would have to search for specifie stimuli 
· with no eues to guide them as on the attribution task or the recognition task. Then, 
once these stimuli were retrieved fro m memory, patiicipants would have to retain 
them simultaneously in consc iousness and th en cou nt how many of them they were 
able to retrieve. Such a process, if at ali poss ible, would be extremely hard and full 
of errors. 
Hence, we could suggest that future research sho uld not pursue comparisons of 
task sets/instructional sets as done here, in part because it is impossible to stop 
participants from forming impressions or recalling information, depending upon 
what the response requirements are on a given dependent measure. It any event, it 
may be wiser to do away with the consolidation task, as done here, and concentrate 
on having every group perform a small task orienti.ng them toward global 
impressions, e.g. likeab ility rating, writing a few key words on their impressions 
of the two targets. We should also remember that this variable seeks to determine 
the underlying process that accounts for the re effect. Since it seems virtually 
irnposs ible to prevent e ither process from occurring when the targets are 
individuals, even if instructions orient the participant in one direction , and 
especially in the context of the re paradi gm where information is presented in 
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random arder about two individuals (as opposed to the typical impression 
formation task where participants deal with one target at a time), it may be more 
fruitful to determine whether a structure/filter/schema as opposed to a 
memory/salience bias forms the basis of the IC effect In other words, future 
research rnight focus on distinguishing between predictions from a connectionist 
framework including post-encoding processes and predictions from a 
straightforward memory-based/salience framework. 
Another constraint to our research was that we expected to find an IC effect for 
bath types of salience (i.e. RwS & ExS), thereby reproducing an earlier study. 
Finding the effect in only one type of salience, leads us to question why this 
distinction was not ever replicated after Hamilton and Giffard (1976). Since our 
results do not co~cur with their study, future research should airn to verify the 
extent ofwhich the original fmdings are replicable. It may be that the use of 
individuals as targets is a special case and that when valences are reversed for other 
categories of abjects the original results will be replicated. 
Procedurally, our frequency estimation task for the RwS condition asked 
participants to estirnate the quantity of negative behaviours (MinB) performed by 
each actor. Participants in the ExS condition were asked about the quantity of 
positive behaviours (MinB) perf01med by each actor. Owing to the pre-conceived 
notions about negative and positive behaviour, we cannat help but wonder if our 
question in the ExS condition may have solicited different cognitive pathways due 
to the wording of our question thereby influencing judgment. Future research may 
refi:ame the questions to "Estirnate the quantity of the less frequent! y observed type 
of behaviour performed for each actor'' so as to eliminate the words "positive" and 
"negative", which may be associated with "good" vs. "bad", although this wording 
might seem awkward to a naïve participant. Future research may also include a 
control where half the participants could be asked to estirnate the quantity of 
majority behaviour. Such a control may also lirnit the effect of a patiicipant trying 
to fulfil what he thinks the experimenter wants. 
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In future research one could tease out the possible interference from dealing 
with two individuals simultaneously and better assess the possible role of absolute 
frequencies. This could be accomplished by presenting one target persan at a time 
and using different absolute frequencies for different targets, while maintaining the 
same proportion in all cases (2: 1). Such an experiment could be done by using a 
between groups design where one group could receive 4 vs. 8 stimuli in two 
behaviour categories white another group would receive 8 vs.16 and yet another 
group could receive 16 vs. 32 stimuli. Valence ofminority and majority behaviour 
should be counterbalanced. A repeated measw-es design might permit each 
participant to do the attribution and frequency estimation tasks for the two 
individual targets in succession, which would help minimize interference for 
remembering or forrning impressions of the two actors at once. 
In conclusion, our study focused on distinctiveness-based Ies and it was based 
on a study by Hamilton and Giffard (1976). We managed to reproduce the effect 
for verbal material involving individuals instead of groups. We also innovatively 
managed to produce the effect with visual stimuli of individuals. Furthermore, we 
also innovated by using a time factor in ow- study. Not only did we find that time 
had a significant effect on the phenomenon; we discovered that an re effect that 
was not present at Tl, was present at T2. These findings lead us to posit that false 
memories could develop as a function of the Ie paradigm. 
We often hear that eyewitness testimony is rather weak at best. Our study 
would corroborate that statement. Finding anIe effect in the visual condition at T2 
when none existed at T 1 signifies that memory is not static and that it is prone to 
more errors as time goes by. Our study also suggests that both visual and verbal 
stimu li are subject to the re bias, which seems to be more influenced by memory 
errors than by a better performance in remembering salient infonnation. 
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Consent form to participate in research 
_____________ agree to participate in the experiment 
being conducted by André Roy, Ph.D. student in the Department ofPsycho logy at 
Université du Québec à Montréal, under the supervision of Dr. Paul Cowen, Ph.D . 
1 understand that the purpose of this research is to measure how information 
about people is processed. 1 also understand that this research is being conducted to 
partial! y fulfill the requirements in obtaining a Ph.D. degree in psychology. 
1 have been informed that the experiment will take place in two sessions, the 
first taking place today and the second next week. During today 's session 1 will be 
presented with a series of photographs (or sentences). After each photograph (or 
sentence), 1 will be asked to answer one question. After the entire series of the 
photographs (sentences) have been presented, I will be asked additional questions 
about the infonnation that was presented. The entire procedure today should take 
.less than 40 minutes. Next week, at the second session, 1 will again respond to a 
series of questions about the information presented today. The second session 
should take less than 15 minutes al! together. I understand that I am free to 
discontinue my participation at any time. I also understand that no deception is 
involved in any part of this experiment and that my anonymity will be respected. 
Participant 's identity will only be available to the experimenter so asto permit the 
compilation of responses from the 2 sessions. Subsequently, this identiftcation will 
be destroyed. 
My responses wi ll be coded and none of the persona! information 1 provide will 
be directly associated with the responses 1 give during the experiment. I understand 
that my participation in the experiment, as well as the information and dataI 
provide, wi Il be kept strictly conftdential. If the results of this study are published, 
only group results and not individual results will be reported. 
ame: (p lease print) _ _______________ _ 
Date 
Age 
Sex (FINI) 
Signature 
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Instructions for memory condition 1 consolidation 
Y ou will be shawn a series photographs (sentences). Each photo (sentence) 
de piets one of two people performing different behaviours. Y our task is to 
remember what each individual is doing. Each photo (sentence) will be presented 
for 8 seconds. Y ou should attend to the photo (sentence) for the who le time it 
appears on the screen. After every photograph (sentence), the screen will go blank 
for eight seconds giving you enough time to write down a few key words that will 
help you remember what was presented on the screen. Use the list below to write 
down the key words for every photo (sentence) in their arder of appearance. 
Writing down key words will help you remember the information so that you can 
answer questions later on. This task has been designed such that enough time is 
given in arder for you to look at the image for the whole time it is being presented. 
Y ou will hear a signal will when a new photograph (sentence) appears. If for any 
reason you have not finished writing your answer, please go back to look at the 
screen. 
' 
J v, "' y' 
' 
. . 
' 
(36 tines) 
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Impression formation instructions 1 consolidation 
Y ou will be shown a series of nurnbered photographs (sentences). Each photo 
(sentence) depicts one oftwo people performing different behaviours. Y our task is 
to forma coherent impression of each individual. Each photo (sentence) will be 
presented for 8 seconds. Y ou should attend to the photo (sentence) for the whole 
time it appears on the screen. After every photograph (sentence), the screen will 
go blank for eight seconds giving you enough time to write down whether the 
person youjust saw (read about) was behaving in a positive or negative way. Use 
the list below to write down the word "positive" or "negative" for every photo 
(sentence) in their order of appearance. Writing down positive or negative will help 
you form an impression so that you can answer questions presented later on. This 
task has been designed such that enough time is given in order for you to look at 
the image for the whole time it is being presented. Y ou will hear a signal will when 
a new photo graph (sentence) appears. If for any reas on y ou have not finished 
writing your answer, please go back to look at the screen. 
Please do not look ahead in the booklet 
This behaviour contributes to a positive (pos.) or negative (neg.) impression of 
the person. 
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F ree recall T 1 
Y ou have just been presented with a series of photographs (sentences) where 
Alex and Chris were performing different behaviours. Below, are two columns 
representing each actor. Please write down in the appropriate column all the 
behaviours that y ou remember for each actor. If you remember the behaviour but 
not the actor, please write the behaviour down in the column that best represents 
you're intuition about who performed it. Please indicate your intuition by writing 
an "X" besides your answer. Write down as many behaviours or actions as you 
can. Once you have completed this task, please rate how confident you are about 
the accuracy of your answers. When you are do ne, put down you're pen or pencil 
and wait for further instructions. Please do not look ahead in the booklet. 
ALEX CHRIS 
v v.v v 
"' -
o/ . v v v /- •/ 
(36 Lines) 
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Recognition task 
T he list below pro vides y ou with a series of descriptions of behaviour performed by Alex or 
Chris. Sorne of them rep resent the sentences y ou have read. Y our task is to decide wh ether or not 
these descriptions correspond to the sentences that were original! y presented. Indicate this by 
putting a check mark (.V) in the app ropriate column at the right of the description. Please give an 
answer for every item. Once you have completed th is task, please rate how confident you are about 
the accuracy ofyour answers. 
Please do NOT go back to add or change answers in the previous section. Please do not look 
ahead in the booklet 
WAS NOT 
_12_resented _l>fesented 
Alex is cleaning snow off a car 
Chris is throwing food on the floor 
Alex is y el! ing at someone on the telephone 
Chris is shooting out the window with his gun 
Chris is washing dishes in the sink 
Alex is doing the laundry 
Chris is cleaning the bathtub 
Chris is scratching the car with the key 
Alex is wri ting " up yours" on the mirror 
Chris is carrying shopping bags into the house 
A lex is getti ng drunk on beer 
Alex is mopping the floor 
Chris is covering his ears white sticking out his tangue 
Alex is fixing a broken toy 
Alex is smashing a chair into the wall 
Chris is study ing his text book 
Alex is g iving his old clothes to charity 
Chris is hanging clothes on a tine to dry 
A lexis picking up litter from the sidewalk 
Chris is pouring ketchup into a eup of coffee 
Chris is tearing a book apart 
A lex is picking hi s nose 
Chris is setting the dinner table 
Alex is spitting at someone 
Chris is shovelling snow from a driveway 
Alex is writing a love note 
Alex is swinging a crow bar at a car window 
Chris is forging someone's signature on a cheque 
Chris is throwi ng a plate on the floor 
Alex is cleaning a window 
Chris is vacuuming the inside of his van 
Alex is s pray painting graffiti on a wall 
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Attribution task 
Y ou wi ll now read descriptions of each of the behaviours presented in the photographs (senten.ces) 
that you saw (read). Y our task is to determine which actor performed the behaviour. Please put a 
check mark (...J) in the appropriate column. Ifyou do not remember the actor, put a check mark in 
. the colurnn that bes t rep resents your intuition. Please indicate your intuition by writing an "X" 
besides your answer. Give an answer fo r every description below. Once you have completed this 
task, please rate how con.fïdent you are about the accuracy of your answers. Please do NOT go 
back to add or change answers in the previous section(s). Again, please do not look ahead in the 
booklet 
Behaviour or act ion ALEX CHRJS 
Putting trash in the garbage bag 
Getting drunk on beer 
Making hi s bed 
Enjoying reading a book 
Cleaning the blinds 
Throwing a plate to the flo or 
Clean ing a spill on the floor 
Fi !ling the recycling bin with paper 
Writing " up yours" on the mirror 
Covering his ears whi le sticking out hi s tangue 
Mopping the floor 
Setting the dinner tab le 
Giving someone the finger 
Writing a love note 
Sh ining hi s shoes 
Holding a kni fe prepared to attack 
Study ing hi s text book 
Cooking food in a big pot 
Giving his old clothes to charity 
Pieking hi s nose 
Serving someone spaghetti and sauce 
Shoot ing out the door with llis sling shot 
Cleaning off the kitchen table 
Washing di shes in the sink 
Peeli ng potatoes at the sink 
Pouring ketchup into a eup ofcoffee 
Putting a band-aid on someone's finger 
Playing Monopo ly 
Vaeuuming the inside of his van 
Dusting the TV 
Breaking a compact di se 
Open ing a car doo r for someone 
Swingi ng a crowbar at a car window 
Preparing to shoot out the window with his gun 
Cleaning snow off of a car 
Changing a li ght bulb on the ce iling fixtu re 
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Frequency estimation task 
In this last part of the experiment, your task is to estimate how many negative 
behaviours each actor performed. We are providing you with the total nurnber of 
photographs (sentences) that were presented for each actor. Once you have 
completed this task, please rate how confident y ou are about the accuracy of y our 
answers. 
P1ease do NOT go back to add or change answers in the previous section(s). 
How many of 
these were negative 
behaviours? * 
ALEX was presented in 24 pictures (24 behaviours) 
CHRJS was presented in 12 pictures (12 behaviours) 
*Note: thts questwnnatre was for RwS . Those m the ExS condition were 
asked: "How many ofthese were positive behaviours?" 
Once you have finished this section, part one of this experiment will be 
complete. Please close yom answer booklet and give it to the persan in front of you 
so that it may reach the first row in front of the class. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION and GENEROSITY. 
THANK YOU FOR CONTRIBUTING TO SCIENCE. 
See you next week for the second (and much shorter) part of the experiment 
after which I wi ll be ab le to answer any questions you may have about the 
experiment. 
Sincerely, André Roy. 
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Written dialogue solicitation for experiment 
Hi, my name is André Roy; I am a doctoral student in psychology at l'UQÀM. I 
wish to thank you al! for allowing me to speak with you for a few minutes. As you 
may or may not know, completing a doctoral degree in psychology is filled with 
different tasks, one of which is conducting a study for research purposes. This is 
the reason for my presence here today. 
You're professor has graciously accepted to contribute 
sorne of her class time, to allow me to conduct a study. She knows that science 
advances only if people gi ve a little of the ir ti me to share in the efforts of others. 
Toda y, I am here to ask if you would kindly allow me sorne of your precious time 
so that 1 can conduct a study. 
The study would take place during class time, and would replace part of the 
lecture for that day. In essence, all you have to dois show up for class like usual, 
but instead of getting a lecture you would learn firsthand how a study is conducted. 
In addition, y ou would be contributing to the advancement of knowledge in the 
field of psychology and more specifically, social perception. 
The study would be in two parts. In part one, 1 would come next week and 
show you a series of photographs or sentences presented on a screen/morùtor. 
During and after the presentation I will ask you to fil! out a number of different 
questionnaires. This would take a little less than 40 minutes. 
The second part of the study would take place the following week and would 
last less than 15 minutes. At that time, [ will hand out another questionnaire that 
you will fil! out. That will complete the study. 
It would be important for yo u to attend at bath times since the information 
collected the second time will be tabulated with the information collected the first 
time. Furthermore, I will be able to answer any questions you may have about the 
study only once it is over. Those ofyou completing bath patis of the experiment 
will be eligible to win a $50.00 cash prize. 
Thank you for your ti me. 
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Written dialogue presenting the experiment to participants 
Hi, my name is André Roy. I am a doctoral student in psychology at I'UQÀM 
and I wish to thank you ali for being here to participate in this research. I am 
certain that sorne of you will continue your education and one day, be in my 
position. Y ou will then be grateful, like I am right now, to have people as generous 
as you are, giving a little oftheir time in order to contribute to the advancement of 
science. Unfortunately, contributing to science in this way is not a lucrative 
business for you or for me but those of y ou who complete the experirnent will be 
eligible to win a $50.00 prize. 
This ex periment consists of measuring how information about people is 
processed. I will be presenting y ou with a series of photo graphs (sentences) and 
asking you to fill out different questionnaires based on what you have seen (read). 
Sorne questionnaires are longer than others are with the last one takingjust a few 
seconds . The total time of your pru1icipation toda y will be about 40 minutes. I will 
not be able to answer questions today, since there is a second, much shot1er (15 
min), part next week. At that time 1 will answer, any ofyour questions. 
Please understand that any information you give will be kept in strictest 
confidence. 
I will now distribute stapled sheets of paper that you will place in front of you. 
It is imperative that you do not; I repeat, do not open the booklet. I previously 
mentioned the different questionnaires and would now like to add that they must be 
filled out in a specifie arder. The reason you may not look at them before I ask you 
to is that it will compromise the entire study and make the results useless, thereby 
wasting y our time and mine. So p lease, just place the booklet in front of y ou and 
read the caver page while everybody gets a booklet. 
(Once everybody has their booklel!;, 1 read the caver page with them (consent 
form) and invite them to complete and sign it.) 
Now that you have ali filled out the first page of the booklet, the experiment 
can begin. There will be different parts to this experirnent and before each of them; 
I will read out the instructions that you need to know for the part. 
Part one: Showing the photograph (sentence) set. 
I will now show you a series of photographs (sentences) about two people named 
Alex and Chris. Each photograph (sentence) will be presented for eight seconds 
followed by an eight-second blank screen. Y our task is to look carefully at what is 
presented on the screen, for the whole time it being presented. After each 
presentation, answer the question in the booklet that bas been provided. 
Please turn to page 2 ofyour booklets The experirnent will now begin 
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DBIC and social stimuli 
Introduction and instructions to experiment (part two) 
Hi again, my name is André Roy. r would like to thank you very much for 
being here toda y. As you know, I am here to present you with part two of the 
experiment we started last week. Tlùs part is much shorter than last week but still 
very important to the study. In fact, although it should take less than 15 minutes to 
complete this task, I ask that you be attentive and serious about it. 
I will hand out a booklet; similar to the one I gave you last week. In it, you will 
find almost the same questionnaires as in the other. I will ask you to complete the 
questionnaires one by one with as much diligence as possible. 
We will now begin. 
122 
